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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD

COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA

-andBELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
_ -yr

The stipulated issue is:
Whether

the

collective

Company

violated

bargaining

the

agreement

relating to vacation treatment for
part-time

employees

being

reclassified to full time?
A hearing was held on April 4, 1997 in Birmingham, Alabama, at
which

time

appeared.

representatives
All

concerned

of
were

the

above-named

afforded

Union

and

full opportunity

Company
to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record was taken; and the
parties filed post-hearing

briefs.

More

specifically,

this matter involves

fifteen computer

attendants who on August 27, 1995 were reclassified from regular parttime status to regular full-time status.
Vacation entitlement is measured beginning on January 1st of
a

given

year.

undisputed

From

that

the

January
grievants

1,

1995

properly

to August
accrued

27,

1995

vacation

it is

pay

and

entitlement computed on their part-time employment of 15 hours of work
per week.

(The full-time work week is 37.5 hours).
After

August

27,

1995,

in

accordance

with

a

Company

Agreement Interpretation and practice, the Company made no change in
the

treatment

of

the grievants

for vacations, continuing

for the

balance of the year the accrual of vacation entitlements on a parttime basis.
The Union contends that when the grievants became full-time
employees they were entitled to the calculation of vacation benefits
on the basis of a full 37.5 hours of work each week.

And that if that

was done, the grievants would have enjoyed, for whatever vacation time
remained to them increased vacation entitlements, based on the fulltime calculations.
The Union relies entirely on certain contract

provisions

which it asserts lead to a conclusion that the grievance should be
granted.

First,

inversely, the Union points out that

there is no

provision in the contract which allows the Company to deny full-time
vacation benefits to employees re-classified full-time.
Next, it cites Article 5, Section 5.06, which, in substance,
quantities

the

amount

of

vacation

pay

seniority, without other limitations.

and

entitlement

based

on

From that the Union argues that

when the grievants achieved full-time seniority, they were entitled to
full-time vacation pay and entitlements.
The Union cites Article 2, Section 2.01, and particularly
Paragraphs B. 2, 3 and 4, thereof.

It asserts that because part-time

employees shall receive
"The

rate

increase.

of

pay

and

amount

. .prorated by

of

relating

his/her hours of work to the normal
work week."
and that
"A part-time employee shall receive
progression

increases

at the same

intervals as full-time employees."
the parties
timers

recognized

became

employee."

contractually

effective

And

"at

the

that pay

same

increases

intervals

as

for part-

a full-time

that the same should apply to increased vacation

benefits when a part-time employee becomes full-time.

In other words,

because there is no hiatus between the date of a pay increase and its
effectiveness, there should be no hiatus in the application of fulltime vacation benefits after an employee becomes full-time.

Indeed,

the Union asserts that vacation pay is a form of wages, and should be
treated similarly.
B-4 provides for a review of part-time employees on April 1
and October 1 of each year (for pay adjustments).

The Union contends

that for the Company not to grant vacation benefit adjustments on and
after August 27th for those prior part-timers who became full-time on
that

date

coincide

is violative of the principle

with negotiated

of adjusting benefits to

improvements and those contractual review

dates.
The Union cites Article 1, Section 1.25, Paragraph C which
provides in pertinent part:
Part-time

employees

and full-time

employees. . .who are subsequently
reclassified
accrue
basis

to

seniority

part-time
on

will

a

pro-rated

as such proration

shall be

determined by the number of hours
worked

per

week

as a percent of

37.5 hours. . ."
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From that the Union argues that if seniority is "prorated"
upon

reclassification,

then vacation benefits

should

similarly be

prorated based on full-time status, on and after an employee changes
from part-time to full-time.
The
contractual

Union's

theory

is similar with

language for holiday pay.

its citation of the

It cites Article 4, Section

4.03 which in substance provides that:
"The holiday allowance paid shall
be

prorated

relationship
part-time

based
of

on

the

the

individual

employee's

'part-time

equivalent work week' to the normal
work week of a comparable full-time
employee. . ."
From this, the Union submits that if holiday allowances are
prorated, the same should be true for vacation benefits.

And that if

a part-timers' holiday pay is prorated without any calendar cut-off
dates, it is contractually

logical, if not mandated that full-time

vacation benefits become effective for the percentage of the vacation
year remaining on and after a part-timer becomes full-time.

In short,

the Union asserts

that

because

pay benefits,

seniority benefits and holiday benefits, among others, are acquired by
employees on the date they achieve the requisite seniority or when
contractually effective, without any calendar hiatus, the same should
obtain to vacation benefits.
achieved

full-time

status

And that therefore, when the grievants
and

seniority,

the

full-time

vacation

benefits should attach prospectively without any delays for any or all
of the employee's remaining vacation time.
The

Company

asserts

that none

of the foregoing

contract

provisions relate to or cover the instant circumstance - namely the
reclassification of part-timers to full-time.
It points out that there is no express contract provision or
language that addresses

this fact situation, and that it was not

raised by either side in contract negotiations.
therefore

that there

was

no

"meeting of

the

The Company concludes
minds"

and

that it

remains, therefore, a managerial right to be dealt with by the Company
unilaterally, provided

the arrangements

the Company promulgates

are

fair and reasonable.
The

Company

contends

that

its

arrangement

under

these

circumstances is logical, fair, and reasonable as well as supported by
uncontested past practice.

More specifically, the Company has interpreted its contract
obligations regarding vacation benefits for part-timers reclassified
to full-time on essentially
employee

was

reclassified

an equitable basis.

on a before

July

1st

If the affected
(i.e. before

the

expiration of 6 months of the vacation year) he was accorded vacation
benefits

of whatever remained of his vacation time on a full-time

employee basis.

But if the reclassification took place after July

1st, (i.e. within the last 6 months of the vacation year) the affected
employee would continue to receive vacation benefits on a part-time
basis.
The
reasonable,

Company views the July
especially

providing otherwise.

in

the

1st cutoff date

absence

of

any

as

fair and

contract

language

It argues that it is manifestly fair to accord

full-time vacation benefits to employees who have worked at least % of
the vacation year as full-timers, and to deny it to those who (like
the grievants in this case) remained part-timers for more than % of
the vacation year.
The Company argues that what the Union seeks would lead to
inequities and unfair results.

It points out that if a part-timer is

reclassified full-time in December, and had not yet taken any vacation
time, his full vacation entitlement, generated by the single month he
was in full-time status would be at the full-time rate.
would be an unfair "windfall."

And that

Similarly, the Company claims that

under

the

Union's

theory,

if,

in

the

reverse,

full-timers are

reclassified to part-time, their vacation entitlements should be cut
appropriately.

Not only has the Company not done so and does not plan

to do so, but explains that that would be unfair to the employee.
concludes

the

Company,

the

fair,

equitable

and

more

So,

easily

administered procedure was to adopt and implement the "one-half" year
formula,

with

the July 1st cut-off date, for part-timers becoming

full-time, and to leave the reverse unaffected.
Finally,

the Company relies on past practice.

It cited

examples of some situations where it applied the "half-year" formula
without objection from the affected employee(s) or the Union.

This

past practice, the Company asserts, is evidence of the reasonableness
of its exercise of managerial rights in this regard and the fairness
of the formula applied, and that the Arbitrator should not legislate a
different

arrangement.

A

change,

collective bargaining not arbitration.

concludes

the

Company

is

for

ARBITRATION

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
UAW, Local 405
CASE NO. 12-30-0197-92

- and Chandler Evans, Inc.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company properly terminated the grievant,
TANYA LITTLE under Article VII, Section 5(d) of the
collective bargaining agreement?

If not, what shall

the remedy be?
A hearing was held on August 28, 1992 at which time the grievant
and representatives

of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The parties filed post-

hearing briefs.
Article VII, Section 5(d) reads:
Seniority for purposes of this Article shall be deemed
to date from the date of original hiring by the
Company of each employee and shall be considered to
have been interpreted only by reason of:

(d) Absence for five (5) consecutive days without
notice or giving adequate reason unless there is a
satisfactory reason for not giving such notice.

bound to it, the Arbitrator shares no responsibility for its grammatical
construction.
As

I

read

it,

interpretations, respectively
Company.

As the burden

termination,

the

it

is

obviously

favorable

to the

subject
grievant

to

different

and to the

is on the Company to prove cause

interpretation favorable

to the grievant

for the

cannot be

ignored.
The circumstances for loss of seniority due to an absence of
five (5) or more consecutive days, may be construed in the alternative.
The alternatives are produced by the word "or" in the sentence reading:
Absence for five (5) consecutive days without notice
or giving an adequate reason unless there is a
satisfactory notice for not giving notice (Emphasis
added).
Reasonably and logically, that can mean that Section 5(d) is
triggered only if notice is not given. And in that case the employee must
give an adequate reason for the absence or for not giving notice.

But, if

notice is given, that is all that is necessary to prevent the loss of
seniority.
The Company would have the Arbitrator

read the sentence as

requiring an adequate reason for the absence whether or not notice is
given.

Based

on that

interpretation

the Company

has presented

an

elaborate and otherwise persuasive case that the grievant's reasons for
her absence are not adequate.
But that position by the Company, despite its factual merit, is
not the sole reasonable interpretation of the section.
Again, a logical reading of the section is that seniority is
lost if the absence is without notice and without satisfactory reason

for not giving such notice, or, again, where notice is not given, the
absence is without adequate reason.

Indeed, the last part of the section:

"...unless there is a satisfactory
giving such notice"
makes it even more confusing.

reason for not

It remains unclear whether the phrases

"adequate reason," and "satisfactory reason" found in two locations in the
section relate to a "reason" for the absence or a "reason" for the failure
to give notice.
With that ambiguity, unclarified by any negotiation history or
past practice in this record, I cannot find that the grievant violated
that contractual section. Under the foregoing interpretation, she met the
threshold condition.

She gave notice of her absence.

She called in sick

on May 30th and 31st, and I accepted the testimony that she or someone on
her behalf called in and notified the Company on June 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 or
substantially over that period.

On June 8, known to the Company, she was

admitted to the Hartford Hospital after taking a drug overdose.

Of

course, if notice is based on a falsified condition or a condition
otherwise lacking in bonafides, discipline would be appropriate not under
Section 5(d), but under Section 5(b) (discharge for just cause).

Those

allegations and that section of the contract are not before me in this
case.
Accordingly, though the Company apparently had certain grounds
to discipline or discharge the grievant, its selection of Article VII,
Section 5(d) was not among them.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above named parties; makes the following Award:
The Company did not properly terminate the grievant,
TANYA LITTLE, under Article VII, Section 5(d) of the
collective bargaining agreement.
She shall be reinstated.
However, because it is
guestionable that she was or would have been medically
or psychologically capable of working during the
period of her discharge, her reinstatement shall be
without back pay.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

October 23, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that
I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which
is my AWARD.

It is undisputed that the grievant has had a history of alcohol
and drug abuse and a record of absenteeism resulting therefrom. Also, she
has been privately

treated

for underlying

or attendant psychiatric

problems and by referral by the Company to its Employee

Assistance

Program.
Based on the record, it is apparent to me that the Company had
grounds to discharge the grievant for chronic absenteeism; for admitted
alcohol and drug use and psychiatric problems which interfered with her
ability to meet her job responsibilities on a regular basis; and for her
refusal or inability to pursue or continue in the Employee Assistance
Program.

But at those times and in those instances, the Company,

magnanimously

withheld

discharge

and

gave

her

another

chance

at

rehabilitation and continued employment.
I understand and appreciate why the Company finally deemed her
absence for a period of nine (9) consecutive days, May 30 through June 7,
1991, during which she admits she drank heavily, used drugs, was deeply
depressed and contemplated suicide, as a final and intolerable example of
her irredeemability.
However, bound as I am to the stipulated issue and to the
contract as negotiated by the parties, I must note that this is not a
discharge case for misconduct; not a discharge for general absenteeism; or
for alcohol or drug use; or even for failure to comply with the Employee
Assistance Program.

The Company did not terminate the grievant on any of

those grounds. Rather it terminated her only or solely under the specific
provisions and conditions of Article VII, Section 5(d).
That Section is not artfully worded.
ambiguity.

It is not clear or free of

The parties negotiated it and presumably worded it.

Though

rJ>'G>
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 702 I.A.T.S.E.
-andDU ART FILM LABORATORIES, INC.

The stipulated issue is:
Does the Company have the right to operate color
negative developing machines #60, 61 and 62 on a
continuous basis with a crew of no more than seven
operators?
A

hearing

representatives

was

held

on

July

21,

1992

at

which

time

of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The stipulated issue notwithstanding, the question arbitrated
dealt with the present operation of the machines with a crew of seven
operators.

My Award will respond to that and not to the as yet unjoined

issue of the operation of the machines with less than seven operators.

On

that, which is not now or yet before me, the rights of the parties are
expressly reserved.

The Union bases its case on two points.
contract

provision

appearing

Department of Schedule A.

in the Note under

The first is the
Negative Developing

That Note reads:

Note:

Color Negative Developing

3 Man Crew:

One Strand

5 Man Crew:

Two Strands

The Union argues that as that Note reguires three operators for
one machine and five operators for two machines, it follows logically and
compellingly that eight operators are contractually reguired for three
machines operating side-by-side.

Put another way, the addition of a

single, third machine, reguires the same manning as one machine —

three

operators.
The second is the assertion that without an eighth operator the
incumbent seven operators cannot be and are not relieved adequately for
needed breaks, meal periods and for personal reguirements.
The parties are reminded that the Arbitrator is bound to the
terms of the contract.
use

of seven

His authority is confined to deciding whether the

operators

to work machines #60,

61 and

continuously side-by-side, is violative of the contract.

62, operating

It is not within

the Arbitrator's authority to base his decision on what he thinks would be
the most convenient or even beneficial arrangement for the operators.
On
argument.

that

ground,

I

cannot

accept

the

Union's

contractual

The Note is silent on the question of the manning of three

machines operating side-by-side.

It is confined to the manning of a

single machine and to the manning of two machines. The parties negotiated
nothing further within the meaning of the Note, and therefore I can find
no basis to extend its meaning beyond its express terms.

The

Union's

opportunities

with

only

case

of

an

alleged

inadequacy

seven operators, has not met the

standard of proof required of the grieving party.
were not operators

of

relief

requisite

The Union's witnesses

from the machines involved and, indeed, were not

employees on the shift on which these machines run.

It is true that one,

at least, is a Union steward who legitimately reported the complaints made
to him by the affected operators.

But they were unable to testify of

their own knowledge of any circumstance where an operator was not or could
not be relieved, when such relief was needed or requested.

The Arbitrator

recognizes and would uphold the right of the operators to reasonable
breaks and relief opportunities in a continuous operation despite the fact
that the contract does not specifically provide for such breaks.

But the

record before me does not adequately show that the incumbent operators
have not been able to gain needed relief breaks.

The Union's case on this

point is limited to bare allegations, and that is not enough to sustain
the grievance.
Under the circumstances set forth in Section 17, the Arbitrator
has the authority to fix a manning level when the parties are in dispute.
Here, the Company has given evidence of the history of the machines in
question; their evolution from ECN(l) to ECN(2) and the changes in their
operations.

I make no new determinations in this proceeding under the

authority of Section 17 because I am not persuaded that there has been
enough of a showing of the kind of significant changes required by that
Section to warrant consideration of an arbitral change in the present
seven operator manning.

Indeed, it is unclear to me how or whether the

current operators are affected by the fact that the machines are now
shorter and run faster, with greater productivity.

Without making a

determination, my inclination is to think that the work, responsibilities

and care that confront the highly skilled negative developers, handling
original negative film, are about the same as before.
The reference to an earlier decision by me in a case between the
Union and Technicolor involving the use of a third operator "primarily for
relief" when a "particular machine" ran continuously, has not been shown
to be applicable to or based on facts similar to the instant case, and
therefore is not precedential.
The Undersigned,
bargaining

agreement

Permanent

Arbitrator

under

the

collective

between the above-named parties, and having duly

heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The Company has the right to operate color negative
developing machines #60, 61 and 62 on a continuous
basis, as it has been doing, with a crew of seven
operators.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED:

August 4, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Local Union 1972, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
AFL-CIO

Case No. 14300046992W

-and-

Eaton Corporation
Bethlehem Assembly Plant

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violated Article XII of the collective
bargaining agreement when it revised the employee
contribution amount for non-generic drugs in the mail
order prescription drug plan?

If so, what shall be

the remedy?
A hearing was held in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania on August 18, 1992
at which time representatives

of the

above-named Union and

Company

appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived and the Company filed a posthearing brief.
More
interpretation

particularly,

this case

involves

the

application and

of Section 12.1 of Article XII, and specifically the

reference therein to "Mail Order Prescription Drugs." That Section reads:
12.1

The Hourly Healthcare Option Plan, Medical

Utilization Review, Mail Order Prescription Drugs,

Though the Mail Order Drug Plan first found its way into the
contract

in 1990, it was unilateral promulgated by the Company as an

employee benefit on October 1, 1987.

The Company's written announcement

r " /'
to its employees dated October 1, i|1987/reads
in pertinent part:
Subject:

Mail Order Prescription Drug Program

Dear Employee:
We are pleased to announce that as part of your
Eaton

Corporation

Medical Benefits

Plan

we

have

included a Mail Order Prescription Drug Program for
you and your eligible dependents.
This Program which is effective October 1, 1987,
provide you with a less costly and more convenient way
to obtain maintenance medications.

You can realize

substantial

$3.00

savings; you only pay

for each

prescription and you may order up to a 90-day supply.
You do not have to satisfy any other deductible.

Plus

you can save time since your prescriptions will be
delivered directly to your door.

(Emphasis added).

Viewing this as an additional benefit for its members, the Union
raised no objection to this unilateral action by the Company.
The instant dispute arose when, on January 6, 1992, the Company
unilaterally

announced

an

increase

in the

co-payment

(i.e.

employee

contribution) for Brand Name Drugs (non-generic) to $10.00 from the prior
contribution of $3.00.

Its letter of January 6, 1992 to its employees/retirees read:
Dear Eaton Employee/Retiree:
The co-payment for each prescription

ordered

under the Eaton Mail Order Prescription Drug Program
has been $3.00 for a 90-day supply since 1986.

The

average cost per prescription when the program was
instituted was expected to be about $30.00.

The

overall cost per prescription is now approximately
$64.00 with the average cost for "brand name" drugs
$77.00 and generic $16.00.
In light of this substantial increase in cost we will
implement a two tier co-payment; one for brand name
drugs

and the

other

for generic

drugs

effective

January 1, 1992 as follows:
Brand Name Drugs:

$10.00 per prescription

Generic Drugs:

$ 3.00 per prescription

You will still be able to order a 90-day supply.

The Union's position

is that the

Company may

not make a

unilateral change in the contract; that Section 12.1 has made the Mail
Order Prescription Drugs Program a bi-laterally agreed to benefit and
condition of employment; that the provision that the program:
"shall be in effect as provided therein and shall
detail the rights and obligations of the parties,"
incorporates by reference the Company's memo of October 1, 1987 in which
the employee cost for all Mail Order Drugs, generic and non-generic, was

$3.00.

And that absent mutual agreement, that contractual arrangement

must continue to obtain and the Company's unilateral effort to increase
the employee contribution must be nullified.
The Company's assertions are basically two fold. It argues that
the Arbitrator should not construe the reference to the Mail Order Drug
Program in Section 12.1 as a condition of employment or as a bilaterally
binding

agreement.

It points

out that

though

the

1990

settlement

agreement on the current contract make specific reference to the Mail
Order Drug Program, there was no bargaining on it, nor even discussion of
it at the bargaining sessions, and only ministerially referred to when
included in the settlement agreement.

That historical assertion is not

denied by the Union.
Additionally, the Company contends that the Mail Order Drug
Program is really part of the Company's Healthcare Plan and subject to the
Company's reserved right, as set forth in the settlement memorandum, to
change the amounts of employee contributions.

This position is based on

the argument that prescription drugs were and still are available to
employees

through

the

Hourly

Healthcare

Options

Plan;

that

the

availability of Mail Order Prescription Drugs offered by the Company
effective October 1, 1987 was an optional benefit in addition to the preexisting availability of drugs through the basis Healthcare Plan; and
therefore the Company's right to unilaterally change the employee's copayment should be construed as applicable to the Mail Order Drug Program
as well as the Healthcare Plan.
In my judgement there are several frailties to the Company's
case.

First, Section 12.1 expressly separates the Mail Order Prescription

Drug Program from the Hourly Healthcare Option Plan.

As a matter of

traditional contract interpretation, both stand alone and on equal footing
as separate entities.

If the Mail Order Drug Program was intended or

deemed to be only an optional part of the Hourly Healthcare Plan, Section
12.1, or some other contract provision or memorandum should have made that
clear.

Absent that, I find more compelling and must conclude that the

Mail Order Program, which came into effect after the basic Healthcare
Plan, and which significantly changed the way employees could get and pay
for prescription drugs, is not just a part of the Healthcare plan even if
drugs were and can still be obtained through the Healthcare plan as well.
In short, the evidence that the Mail Order Plan is a new and different
benefit is more convincing than the argument that it is adjunct to the
basic Healthcare Plan.
With that finding, and for at least two reasons, the Company's
reserved right to change the amount of the employee's contribution is not
applicable to the Mail Order Drug Program.

First, that reserved right is

positioned in the 1990 Settlement Agreement not after Section 12.1 but
before Section

12.1 at the end of the specific schedule of employee

contributions to the Hourly Healthcare Plan.

Ordinary and traditional

contract interpretation points to only one logical conclusion.

It is that

the reserved right clause at the end of the Section before 12.1 applies to

the enumerated
procedure

as

employee contributions
well

as

the

right

to

above it, and sets forth the
make

changes.

Therefore

the

"contributions" referred to in the clauses:
"Any changes in contributions will be announced a
minimum of 30 days prior to the effective date of the
change"
are the specific employee contribution to the Family Standard Healthcare
Plan and to the Single and Family Optical Coverage Plan.
Secondly,
employee

assuming

contribution

arguendo

applied to

that

the

right

the Mail Order

to

Drug

change the

Program, the

Company's notice of the changed contribution did not comply with the
foregoing clause.

It's notice to employees that Brand Name Drugs would

require a $10.00 co-payment was dated January 6, 1992 and made effective
January 1. 1992.

The required 30-days notice was not given.

This also

leads me to believe that the Company did not think or did not intend that
the foregoing reservation clause was applicable to the Mail Order Drug
Plan, when that clause was negotiated.
Finally,

the

Company's

contention

that

the

Mail

Order

Prescription Drug Plan should not be construed as a collectively bargained
and bilaterally binding benefit, is not persuasive as a matter of law.
The moment it became a part of the 1990 contract either by
mutual agreement, no matter how casual, or by ministerial action, it
acquired, as a matter of basic contract law, all the characteristics and
enforceability of every other part of the collective agreement^
[
I find no basis, either as an exception to the parol evidence \e

unconditional and unambiguous contract provision to see how it got into
the contract and to consider if its meaning or effectiveness is equivocal,
limited or different from any other contract provision.

That there may

have been no bargaining discussions or bargaining "give and take" leading
to the inclusion of the Mail Order Plan in the contract, is immaterial.
The settlement memorandum of April 5, 1990 is specifically titled "Final
Company Proposal."

That Proposal, which was accepted and ratified by the

Union, included, as apparently written by the Company, the exact wording
of the present Section 12.1 of the contract.
the Mail Order Prescription

That made Section 12.1, and

Drug Program a part of the bilaterally

negotiated and agreed to contract, with binding effect on both parties to
the contract.

Indeed, the final words of Section

12.1, manifestly

applicable to the Mail Order Prescription Drug Program,:
"and shall detail the rights and obligations of the
parties (Emphasis added)"
is a clear recognition that the inclusion of the Mail Order Program in the
contract created rights and obligation for both parties.

The Company's

claim that the Mail Order Plan should be viewed as not collectively
bargained cannot stand the application of the clear meaning of that latter
language.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company violated Article XII of the collective
bargaining agreement when it revised the employee
contribution amount for non-generic drugs in the Mail
Order Prescription Drug Plan.

Until

and

unless

there

is mutual

agreement

otherwise, the employee contribution for non-generic
drugs shall be restored to $3.00 per prescription.
Employees who have paid $10.00 per prescription shall
be reimbursed by the Company for the difference.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

October 5, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IUE, Radio & Machine Workers
Local 901
and

OPINION

and

AWARD

Case No. 51 300 0174

92B

General Electric Company
The stipulated issue is:
Did The Company violate Article XI of the 19881991 GE-IUE National Agreement or Local Supplement in May 1991 when Ken Saylor, William Mai in
and Gary Alig were denied displacement to the
Code 1755 C~45 Tester-Transformer Developmental
position? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 15, 1992 in Fort Wayne, Indiana
at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record was taken; and
subsequently each side filed a post-hearing brief.
The relevant contractual provisions of Article XI and the
Local Supplement read:
Article XI Reduction or Increase in Forces
Whenever there is a reduction in the working
force or employees are laid off from their
regular jobs, total length of continuous service, applied on a plant, department, or other
basis as negotiated locally, shall be the major
factor determining the employees to be laid off
or transferred (exclusive of upgrading or transfers to higher rated jobs). However, ability
will be given consideration.
Supplemental Agreement
TRAINING PERIODS TO QUALIFY
1. Employees with less than one year of
service may displace shorter service
employees on like or the same kind of
work in the same department where

-2-

fully qualified or where training time
will not exceed ten working days.
2. Employees with over one year of continuous service may displace employees who
have less continuous service, providing
they can qualify with incidental training (15 working days).
3. Employees with over four years of continuous service may displace employees
who have less continuous service, providing they can qualify with 20 working
days training.
4. Employees with over five years of continous service may be given additional
training in order to qualify.
Messrs. Saylor, Malin and Alig hereinafter referred to as the
grievants, hold Power Supply Electronic Laboratory Technician
positions in job Code 1758.

The Company refused to permit them

to displace less senior employees in Code 1755 positions "because
of their lack of transformer experience and the extensive training
which would be required for them to learn the transformer design
job."
Based on the record before me, I am satisfied that the
issue is narrowed to whether the grievants could perform the
design aspects of the 1755 job with training that did not exceed
the periods of time specified in the Supplemental Agreement.
I so conclude from my colloquy at the hearing with Mr.
Leroy J. Jackemeyer, the Company's

Senior QC Engineer of the

Advanced Motor Division, as follows:
MR. ARBITRATOR: Let me understanding something.
Are you saying that the thing that at least in
your mind, the thing that significantly distinguishes. 1755 from 1758 at the present time and at
the time that the grievants attempted to bump is
the design engineering technician function?
MR. JACKEMEYER:

That's correct.

-3MR. ARBITRATOR:
If you removed that function,
if that was not part of 1755, what would your
position be with regard to the relative difficulty, complexity or inter-changeability of the
two jobs?
MR. JACKEMEYER: It would be much less but there
would still be some training required. I think
as stated earlier by one of the people—one of
the witnesses, probably six to eight weeks.
Also, this conclusion is the logical consequence of the
fact that prior to 1986, the grievants were in the same 1755
job code of the Tester-Transformer Development positions.

But,

when design functions became part of the bargaining unit job, the}
were not given that function.

Rather, they continued their power

supply work under a new code - Code 1758, and the design work became part of Code 1755.
But for the design function of Code 1755 and assuming the grievants had the requisite seniority as required by the Supplemental
Agreement, I would have sustained this grievance.

Though the

transformer and power supply work of the two Codes are demonstrably different, I conclude that the grievants had enough skill
and experience from their Code 1758 work to adjust to and adequate
ly learn the requirements of the other components of the 1755 job
substantially within the training time limits of the Supplemental
Agreement.

I think the Company's estimate of six to eight weeks

for the grievants to be able to perform those duties is not
beyond the substantive range of 20 working days of training specified in the Supplemental.
Not so, however, for the design component.
position on this point is essentially twofold.

The Union's

First is that the

design duties could be performed by the grievants with short

-4-

periods of training.

The second is that the design work should

not be part of the 1755 job and that therefore the grievants
should not be disqualified from exercising their seniority bumping rights because of the claim that they cannot perform or learn
those duties.
The weight of the evidence and a well settled arbitral
rule, negates the first position.

The Arbitrator's knowledge of

the technical aspects of the 1755 and 1758 jobs, and particularly
the design functions of the former, is limited to the record in
this case.

It is recognized by a substantial majority of arbi-

trators, including this arbitrator, that in disputes over "seniority and ability," the employer's judgment about an employee's
ability to perform Or learn a job should be accorded a presumption
of validity unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious or demonstrably unreasonable.

(See How Arbitration Works, Fourth Edition,

Elkouri and Elkouri, pages 613-614).
Here, I accept the Company's testimony by its Senior
Product Engineer and its Senior QC Engineer that six to nine months
would be needed for the grievants to become substantially proficient.

There is nothing in this record which would indicate that

those witnesses personally, or their estimates of required training time, were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

That quan-

tity of training time materially exceeds the contractually agreed
to limits of training time in displacement cases as specified in
the Supplement.

And there is no contention in this case that the

aofresaid provisions of the Supplemental Agreement are not applicable or binding.

The Company is not required to grant

training beyond 20 working days.
discretion.

It "may" do so at its

additional

-5-

The Union's second contention is misplaced in this case.
It is a collateral attack on the job duties of Code 1755.

I am

not persuaded that a case challenging the Company's denial of a
displacement

bump may include a challenge to the job duties of

the job into which the grievant seeks to bump.

Rather, confined

to the stipulated issue, my authority, I believe, is limited to
whether the grievants, admittedly with greater seniority than the
incumbents, possess the ability to perform the 1755 job duties
with no more training than allowed under the Supplemental Agreement.

I do not see my authority as extending to finding or order-

ing a change in or an elimination of one of the present duties of
the 1755 job - namely the design function.

As I see it, that

is a matter for a different case if grievable, or for collective
bargaining, but not within the instant stipulated issue.
Moreover, without prejudice to the Union's position in another proceeding, it must be noted that the design function became part of the Code 1755 job in 1985, when a Don Rogers, who did
the design work as an exempt employee was reclassified to an
hourly job and continued that work as part of the bargaining unit.
The Union did not object to that inclusion at that time.

Nor did

the Union object to the design function as part of Code 1755 over
the last three years during which that design work was performed
as part of the 1755 job by incumbent employees Kuzemka and Horn.
Finally, that those two latter named employees were
permitted to take the design positions though both required extensive training to be able to perform therein, is not relevant

6~
to this case.

They did not bump into those jobs.

Hence the dis-

placement provision and the training time limits of the National
Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement did not apply.

At

the time, the positions were open, and presumably were filled by
bid, not bump.

The Company's position on this is not refuted.

Whoever was assigned to the job had to be trained and trained
extensively.

It was not, as here, a situation where an employee

who would require extensive training sought to bump an incumbent
who

was already qualified or substantially qualified.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article XI
of the 1988-1991 GE-IUE National Agreement or Local Supplement in May 1991 when
Ken Saylor, William Malin and Gary Alig
were denied displacement to the Code 1755
C~45 Tester-Transformer Development
Positions.

DATED: October 26, 1992
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Office and Professional Employees
International Union, Local 153
OPINION AND AWARD

and
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union

-X
The issue is:
What shall be the disposition of Local 153's grievance
on behalf of CAROLINE JOHNSON?
A hearing was held on March 4, 1992 at which time Ms. Johnson,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of Local 153
and the I.L.G.W.U., hereinafter referred to respectively as the "Union"
and the "Employer" appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's oath was waived.
The

grievant

was

suspended

for

four

weeks

because

of

unsatisfactory attendance, particularly a record of excessive tardiness.
The Union does not dispute the unsatisfactory and extensive
nature

of that

record.

In this case, the Union only disputes the

magnitude of the penalty, asserting that a four-week suspension is too
severe.

It points out that the grievant is acknowledged by the Employer

to be a very good worker who was promoted and received a merit increase
over the period of time of her latenesses.

The Union asks the Arbitrator

to reduce the penalty to a more moderate level.

I conclude that I do not have the contractual authority to do
what the Union asks.
Article IV Section 4.2 of the contract reads:
4.2

If, upon joint investigation by the Union and the

Employer, or by decision of an Arbitrator, it shall be
found that an employee has been unjustly discharged or
suspended, such employee shall be reinstated to the
former position held without any loss of seniority or
rank, shall suffer no reduction of salary and shall be
compensated

by

the

Employer

for

all

time

lost,

computed at the regular rate of wages received by said
employee prior to the date of discharge or suspension.
To my mind, that language means that only if a suspension is
found to be "unjust," may the penalty imposed be reversed, and in that
case, the penalty is set aside and expunged totally.

That is what is

referred to as an "either/or" disciplinary clause.

Therefore, if a

suspension is not "unjust," the extent of the suspension cannot be changed
or modified downward, as the Union seeks in this case, unless, of course,
the magnitude of the suspension is manifestly disproportionate to the
offense committed or unduly harsh.
Here, it cannot be concluded that a suspension was "unjust."
The grievant's poor attendance record is conceded.
justifies a disciplinary penalty.

Universally, that

She had been previously warned that her

attendance record was unacceptable and told that unless improved, she
would

be

subject

to

greater

discipline.

So,

the

requirements

of

"progressive discipline" were complied with by the Employer.
Nor am I able to conclude that a four-week suspension was too
harsh or out of proportion to the offense.

Though one may argue that a

lesser period of suspension would have been adequate, it does not follow
that a suspension of four weeks is so
harsh

penalty

or wrongly

responsive

lengthy as to be an improperly
to the grievant's

inability or

unwillingness to come to work on time.
Her explanation that she had transportation problems is just
that —

an explanation; but it is not an excuse.

Other employees with the

same or more difficult travelling schedules, manage to arrive on time.
The grievant could have and should have done so too, even if it meant
leaving for work earlier.

And it is well-settled that a poor attendance

record is cause for discipline, even if the reasons for it are beyond the
employee's fault or control.
That she was promoted and granted a merit increase do not
immunize her from discipline for her attendance record.

It is undisputed

that when promoted and when she was given the merit increase —
her

acknowledged

latenesses.

good

Those

work

—

warnings,

she was expressly
accompanying

the

both for

warned

about her

promotion

and merit

increase, preserved the Employer's right to take the disciplinary action
taken in this case.

The
bargaining

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

collective

agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly

heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
AWARD.
The Union's grievance on behalf of CAROLINE JOHNSON is
denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

March 6, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

JURISDICTIONAL POLICY OF THE METAL
TRADES DEPARTMENT AFL-CIO
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD and OPINION

IAM Lodge 480
and
SMWIA, Local Union #5
-X
The stipulated issue is:

Whether the IAM Lodge 480 or the SMWIA, Local Union #5
shall perform the reworking of casting flaws and voids
in parts at the Martin-Marietta Energy Systems Inc.,
Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee?
A hearing was held on June 16, 1992 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee at
which time representatives of the above-named Unions appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Both sides were given the opportunity to file a post-hearing
brief by July 5, 1992.

The SMWIA, Local Union #5 did so.

As the caption of this case and the stipulated issue indicate,
this is a jurisdictional dispute between the above-named Unions, submitted
to arbitration in accordance with the Jurisdictional Policy of the Metal
Trades Department, AFL-CIO.
accordance with this policy.

The Undersigned Arbitrator was selected in

The particular work in dispute is performed on a part that is
highly

classified.

Therefore

the

part

itself

was

not

disclosed,

identified or in anyway revealed to the Arbitrator at the hearing or
otherwise.

Because of this secrecy, both parties and the Arbitrator

recognize that facts and evidence that might otherwise have been presented
and which might have helped in the decision making, could not be offered
into evidence.

Accordingly, all that is before the Arbitrator is the

narrow guestion posed in the stipulated issue and only evidence that could
properly

be

adduced, considering

the

classified

nature

of the part

involved.
The part in question has been developed and made in two stages.
At first, for about five years, it was a prototype.

Though members of

both Unions worked generally on certain aspects of the prototype, it is
uncontested that the IAM Lodge 480 members (hereinafter referred to as the
"machinists") exclusively "reworked the casting flaws and voids."
Essentially,

on

this

historical

practice

and

exclusive

assignment rests the machinist's claim for the work in this proceeding.
After completion of the "prototype," the part was made (and is
being made) for "production."

The instant "production" part is much

larger than was the prototype.

Consequently, the record indicates, the

"casting flaws and voids" are larger.
"production"

and with

the

increase

With the shift from prototype to
in the

size of the

part and a

corresponding increase in the size of its casting flaws and voids the
Martin-Marietta management assigned the "reworking of the flaws and voids"
to the members of the SMWIA, Local Union #5, (hereinafter referred to as
the "sheet metal workers.11)

Because of a .change in the operational methods for reworking the
flaws and voids between the smaller prototype and the considerably larger
"production"

part;

because

of OSHA

regulations

applicable

to

those

operational methods and because to do otherwise would be an intrusion by
the Arbitrator on a managerial prerogative, I conclude that the disputed
work should continue to be performed by the sheet metal workers.
Based on the record before me, I find that during its prototype
phase, the flaws and voids were reworked by the machinists by using hand
tools, primarily

files, drills and hand grinders.

At the same time,

however, large scale, heavy or sophisticated grinding generally, was done
by and within the jurisdiction of the sheet metal workers.

That grinding

work was done in a special grinding room, open only to the sheet metal
workers.

That room is eguipped with exhaust systems

to remove dust

produced from grinding, and only there can grinding be done in present
compliance with the requirements of OSHA.
Significant to this case is that the operational methods to
rework the flaws and voids in the larger production model of the part
involves primarily grinding of a magnitude and quantity different from
what was done on the prototype and of a type that has to be done in the
grinding

room.

In

short, the

method of

reworking

the flaws and voids

and preparing them for the welder, changed significantly, from work that
had been done by machinists to work more historically and traditionally
done by the sheet metal workers.

With that shift in methods, tools and

location, the transfer of this work from the machinists to the sheet metal
workers was neither illogical or unreasonable.
This is not to say that the machinists could not perform the
type of grinding presently used to rework the flaws and voids in the
production

part.

Clearly,

based

on

their

skills,

experience

and

abilities, they can.

Indeed, it was stipulated in the record that both

crafts possess the ability and qualifications to do the current work.
But, to assign the work to the machinists would require not only
that the machinists take on grinding work of a scope and nature primarily
and previously performed by the sheet metal workers, but because of OSHA
standards, would require the introduction and presence of machinists in
the grinding room, where they have not worked, or the creation by the
Company of another grinding area for the machinists which complies with
OSHA rules.

Either would constitute, in my view, an arbitral intrusion on

the well-recognized management prerogative to determine the methods and
means of production —

a step I feel I should take only if the Company's

assignment was arbitrary or clearly wrong.

Neither is the case here.

For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, duly designated as
the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The SMWIA, Local Union #5 shall perform the reworking
of casting flaws and voids in parts at the MartinMarietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant,
Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

July 14, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case# 113000192191

- and John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Company acted in violation of the contract
by

providing policies

for

sale by the

Marketing

Representatives despite the fact that there was no
agreement with the Union concerning the compensation
to be paid the Marketing Representative for the sale
of such policies?
A

hearing

was

If so, what shall be the remedy?

held

on

December

16,

1991

at

which

time

representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The tripartite board of arbitration was

The issue was submitted to the Undersigned as sole arbitrator.

The Arbitrator's oath was waived.

A stenographer record of the hearing

was taken, and the parties filed post hearing briefs.

In dispute is the interpretation and application of Article VII,
Management Rights, and particularly Paragraph 6 thereof. Paragraph 6 sets
forth certain managerial rights as follows:
"The unqualified right within its discretion to alter
or

amend

underwriting

regulations,

practices,

rules

and

including the right to determine the

types and classes of policies to be sold...
However, Paragraph 6 goes on to set forth an exception, as
follows:
"...except

that

compensation
Marketing

the

Marketing

applicable to

Representatives

Representative's

policies

sold

by

the

shall be arrived at by

mutual agreement of the Company and the Union."
In this case, the Company and the Union have not yet agreed on
the compensation to be paid Marketing Representatives for the sale of a
long-term-care insurance policy known as Protect Care, classed in terms of
risk as a Substandard II policy.1
Nonetheless, the Company has provided this policy for sale to
the public, and by doing so, has made it one of the "products" which the
Marketing Representatives may sell.2
The Union's position is that the foregoing exception to various
management rights bars the Company from making a policy available for sale

parties have agreed on an interim rate of compensation,
subject to this arbitration. It is undisputed that the Union
does not accept this rate as adequate, but has agreed to its
implementation pending this arbitration so that the Marketing
Representatives can receive some compensation in the interim.
2The Marketing Representatives are not required to sell this
or any other Company product. But their commission income and
"productivity" depend on their cumulative sales of Company
insurance policies generally.

until and unless the rate of compensation for the Marketing Representatives selling that policy has been mutually agreed to.

As that has not

yet been done, the Union asks the arbitrator to enjoin the sale of the
policy

in question,

and to grant certain

requested

compensation to

Marketing Representatives who have sold it.
The Company contends that it may provide the policy for sale,
even

if and

while

there

is no

final agreement

with

the

Union on

compensation

for the Marketing Representatives, so long as the Company

pays

Representatives

those

retroactively

compensation rate is ultimately established.

for

their

sales

when

the

This procedure, the Company

argues is consistent with past practice and a proper balance between its
managerial and exclusive right to "determine the types and classes of
policies to be sold," and conditions of employment, such as compensation,
which are mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
Put another way, the questions in dispute are:
At what point shall the Marketing Representatives
compensated for the sale of a new type of policy?
availability

of that policy

for sale?

Or may

be fully

From the outset of
they

be made whole

retroactively after an agreed upon rate of compensation is reached?
The former, of course, precludes sales until compensation is
agreed to.

The latter permits sales while negotiations for the rate of

compensation are still going on and pending their completion.
The disputed contract section does not provide the answer.
that

sense

it

is

ambiguous

because

reasonably, to either interpretation.

it

is

subject,

logically

In
and

It is a fair interpretation of

Paragraph 6 to deem mutual agreement on a rate of compensation for the
sale of a policy as necessary before the policy can be offered for sale.
Especially so when pay is a critical part of the employment relationship;
when its mutual agreement is so manifestly expressed in the contract; and
when it is such a specific restriction
rights.

on the enumerated management

Contrary-wise it is an equally fair interpretation of Paragraph

6 to deem it simply as an express listing in the management rights clause
of a subject that is not a managerial prerogative.
distinguish

compensation,

as a mandatorily

The purpose being to

bargainable condition of

employment, from an enumeration of management rights.

But, with that

purpose contractually clarified and achieved, it should not be extended
interpretively

to constitute

a condition precedent

to the Company's

managerial right to make policies available for sale.
Ambiguities in collective bargaining agreements are resolved by
arbitrators

by resort

to past practice and negotiation history.

A

consistent practice known to or accepted by both parties, may be construed
as a bilateral clarification of the ambiguity, and evidence of what the
parties

intended

or were willing to accept as the

application and

interpretation of the otherwise ambiguous contract provision. A review of
bargaining history related to the contract language or the subject matter
of the substantive disagreement can be equally enlightening.
Here there is both a negotiation history and a past practice
which bear scrutiny.
The Union asserts that twice in contract negotiations, in 1981
and 1984 the Company sought but failed to obtain from the Union a contract

provision which would allow it to provide policies for sale even if the
parties had not reached mutual agreement on the compensation to be paid
the Marketing Representatives.
On the other hand, the Company points to "past practice."

It

shows that twice, in 1979-80 and 1988 under the same contract language, it
provided for sale new types of policies or made significant changes in
policies for sale without having first reached agreement with the Union on
the rate of compensation for the Marketing Representatives.

In those

respective instances, the Marketing Representatives sold a new flexible
premium annuity, a revised premium notice ordinary life and flexible life
insurance policies, and when the compensation rates were mutually agreed
to, they were paid and made whole retroactively.
As between these two divergent positions, the latter, namely the
practice of 1979-80 and 1988, is more probative and persuasive as evidence
of the way the parties interpreted, and applied Paragraph 6. Considering
the apparent rarity of a failure to agree on compensation at the time new
policies were available for sale, and the absence in this record of any
other such prior situations, I conclude that the two instances in 1979-80
and 1988, factually similar to the instant case, meet the definition of a
past practice for interpretive purposes.
The Union's evidence on the contract negotiations of 1981 and
1984 is sparse at best.

A single Union witness testified about it based

on his "best recollection."

No documentation in support was introduced.

No written contract demands; no minutes of negotiation sessions; and no
correspondence dealing with the alleged Company proposal and the Union's
rejection of it, were produced in this record.

Unlike the "negotiation history," the sale of the policies in
1979-80 and 1988 before compensation was agreed to was based on more
probative evidence.

It was known to the Union.

made no objection and filed no grievance.

In 1979-80, the Union

In 1988, it sent a letter of

protest, but did not formally grieve or pursue the matter to arbitration.
Indeed, in its report to the Presidents of its Local Unions with Company
membership, the Union's position was equivocal.

That part of the report

of July 21, 1988 dealing with sale of the policies before compensation was
agreed to, stated inter alia;
"...it is the Union's position that agents should not
sell new products.
some

instances

circumstances

However, we do recognize that in

when

'needs selling1

is followed,

may arise that will necessitate

selling of the new product line.

the

However, if such a

situation is necessary and the product is sold, it
should be clearly understood that it is the Union's
firm position that no commission can be paid.

We

encourage all agents in your attempts to serve and
satisfy your client's needs, to do this through the
sale of those products which remain available to you.
Also, in both instances, the Union and the Company subsequently
negotiated a compensation rate and the Union and its membership accepted
that rate as it was paid retroactively.
I conclude that those two instances, as the only ones in which
the issue was previously confronted, pragmatically represented an agreed

to balance between the Company's managerial right to market its products
and the Union's right to engage in negotiations over and obtain adequate
compensation

for the sale of those products, within

the meaning of

Paragraph 6 of Article VII of the contract.
Recognizing, as both sides do in this case, that compensation
rates are mandatory

subjects of collective bargaining,

it should be

recognized also that it is not uncommon in labor relations and under
collective bargaining agreements for employees to work at bargaining unit
duties while negotiations for the wage rates or for changes in the wage
rates for those duties are ongoing.

In those circumstances, the later

agreed to wages or changes are applied retroactively.

This is true, for

example, in fixing rates for new jobs, changed jobs, and for incentive and
piece worked jobs under and during a collective bargaining agreement, and
wage increases in successor collective bargaining agreements, when the
expired contract "status quo" is maintained or extended.
So, as long as there is retroactivity in this case, the instant
circumstances are not unprecedented.
The Union rightly poses the question —

what would happen to a

Marketing Representative's compensation for sales of new policies while
the rate is not yet fixed, if the parties can never agree in the rate?

At

the hearing, I ruled that that was not presently before me, and that it is
correct.

Though it does not become a justiciable issue until and unless

negotiations to determine the rate fail, I find that it is currently
relevant in a particular respect as indicated below and in the Award.

I

do not agree with the Company that upon that failure it could unilaterally
implement its last offer to the Union.

That may apply in a typical

bargaining setting for a new contract or for a term or condition of
employment not covered by an effective collective bargaining agreement.
Here, however, the effective contract calls for mutual agreement on the
rate of compensation.

If such agreement is not reached, it becomes, in my

view, a dispute under the contract.
arbitration under the contract.

As such, it is then a matter for

As the arbitrator

is authorized to

resolve contract disputes, he would be, therefore, empowered to determine
the

compensation

rate.

To

permit

the

Company

to

impose

a

rate

unilaterally would be contrary to the contractually requirement that it be
"arrived at by mutual agreement." An arbitral decision fixing the rate if
direct negotiations fail, is certainly more consistent with what the
contract contemplates than unilateral implementation of the Company's last
rate offer.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the contract by providing
policies for sale by the Marketing Representatives
despite the fact that there was no agreement with the
Union covering compensation to be paid the Marketing
Representatives for the sale of such policies.
It is not a contract violation provided that when the
compensation is mutually agreed to, the Marketing
Representatives
retroactively

are

paid

that

compensation

for all prior sales.

So that the

Marketing Representatives are fully compensated there
shall be added to the retroactive payment, interest at
the statutory rate.

In the event that the parties do not agree on the
compensation, that issue should be deemed a dispute
under the collective bargaining agreement, and shall
be

resolved

by

arbitration,

with

the

arbitrator

authorized to fix the rate of compensation.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:

March 4, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
and
NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
„

V

The Union claims that the Company violated Article 33, Fourth
Paragraph of the contract when it ordered JOHN BRADFORD to return to duty
on January 30, 1992 after he underwent a Company ordered blood test at New
Rochelle Hospital.
A hearing was held on June 8, 1992 at which time Mr. Bradford,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the
above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

While on duty, returning to the office after discharging school
children, the grievant was involved in an accident with the bus he was
operating.

A Company supervisor took the grievant to the New Rochelle

Hospital for a blood test to determine whether he
influence of alcohol or...used marijuana or other
during

or

was "under

controlled

in close proximity to working hours...".

the

substances

The action by the

Company was under Article 33 of the contract, the pertinent parts of which
read:
In the event of drunkenness, use of marijuana or
other controlled substances, improper fare handling,
an altercation or insubordination, the Employer may
take immediate action by suspending the employee and
arrange for a hearing within twenty-four hours.

All employees suspected of being under the
influence of alcohol and/or using marijuana or other
controlled substances shall be required to submit to
appropriate medical tests which shall be administered
at the Employer's expense.
These tests shall be
administered at a recognized hospital. In the event
the employee refuses to submit to such medical
examination after having been duly requested to do so,
such employee shall be discharged forthwith. If it is
determined through appropriate medical tests that the
employee was under the influence of alcohol during
working hours or that said employee used marijuana or
other controlled substances during or in close
proximity to his or her working hours, such employee
shall be subject to immediate discharge. The standard
regular tests to be agreed upon by the Employer and
the Union administered by the designated hospital
and/or laboratory in accordance with its usual
procedures to determine the use of alcohol, marijuana
and other controlled substances shall be acknowledged
by the Employer and the Union to be conclusive.
If said employee is found to not have been under
the influence of alcohol or to have used marijuana or
other controlled substances during or in close
proximity to working hours, the Employer agrees to pay
him all monies he would have earned on regular
assignment had he not be suspended and no record of
this examination shall be entered in his employment
record.
After

the blood

test,

the

Company's

supervisor

drove the

grievant back to the Company office where he was given another bus and
dispatched

for the afternoon portion of his run for that day.

The

grievant was paid for the full day.
The Union contends that upon being taken for a blood test, the
grievant should have been placed in suspended status and not return to
active employment until the results of the blood tests were made known and
proved negative.
The Union argues that as a matter of public policy and under the
provisions of the foregoing contract language is the requirement that an
employee tested

for alcohol or controlled

substance

use may not be

returned to work until the results of the tests are officially known.

To

test him and to return him to work before the test results are determined

is, in the Union's view, an abuse of the Company's contractual right to
require a blood test only for probable cause and prejudicial to the public
safety.
The Union

asserts that the Company must

be deterred

from

requiring a blood test as a tactic of harassment under circumstances like
the instant case where, because the employee would not lose compensation
for the day, the Company could order tests arbitrarily and with impunity.
To deter the Company from doing so the Union seeks an Award by the
Arbitrator directing the Company to pay the grievant his wages from the
time the blood test was taken to the date its results were known, on top
of the pay he received for that period from active employment.

And

because in the instant case the Company is unable to fix the latter date
the Union seeks the pay penalty until the date of this Award.
The Arbitrator is bound to the terms of the contract.

I do not

read the contract to require the suspension of the employee that the Union
says is warranted by the public policy and contemplated by Article 33,
managerial good judgment notwithstanding.
The second paragraph of Article 33 states that the Employer
"may" suspend an employee "in the event of drunkenness, use of marijuana
or other controlled substances..." I do not interpret that permissive
language to mean that it must suspend such an employee.
A requirement of a suspension, as interpreted by the Union, must
be more explicit and unconditional.

Indeed, the third Paragraph of

Article 33 makes clear that the parties knew how to mandate the penalty of
discharge in the case of the use of alcohol or a controlled substance
under the stated circumstances.

By using the mandatory word "shall," the

Company is required to discharge an employee "forthwith" who "refuses to
submit to (a) medical examination...when suspected

of being under the

influence of alcohol and/or a controlled substance" and if the medical
tests show that the employee was "under the influence of alcohol during
working hours and. . .used marijuana or other controlled substance during or
in close proximity to his or her working hours."

If, like discharge, a

suspension was to be contractually mandated and intended in cases where a
medical test is administered and until the results of that test are known,
the contract could have and should have so provided at this point.

It

does not.
The

fourth

Paragraph of Article

33 upon which

the Union

specifically relies, provides for reimbursement to an employee who is
found not to have been under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance of "monies he would have earned had he not been suspended." But
that is premised on having been..s^jsjoejojiefL.---It does not require that he be
suspended.

Rather it makes him whole for monies lost if he is suspended.
Here the grievant was not suspended and lost no pay. Ultimately

the results of his blood and urine tests were negative for alcohol and
drugs.

Though it is unclear why the Company continued him on duty before

the blood test results were known, and the Company did so at its own
peril,

I

cannot

unconditional

find under

duty

to

the

suspend

contract

him,

that

public

the

policy

Company had an
notwithstanding.

Therefore, the public policy questions raised by the Union, albeit matters
of importance, are for a different forum.
of its contractual

However, abuses by the Company

right to require medical tests under circumstances

stated in the contract will not be allowed by the Impartial Chairman, and
may be readily redressed through the grievance and arbitration provisions
of the contract.
abuse.

I do not find the single instant circumstance to be an

The
bargaining

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

collective

agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly

heard the proof and allegations of said parties, makes the following
*

Award:
The Company did not violate Article 33 fourth
paragraph of the contract when it ordered John
Branford to return to duty on January 30, 1992 after
his blood test the same day.

^^^i^^T
Eric J\z
(J
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

June 17, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

Impartial Chairman, Local 100 Transport
Workers Union of America - and - New
York Bus Service
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Opinion and Award
Transport Workers Union of America,
Local 100
(Clarification of Kheel
Award of October 18, 1979)

- and New York Bus Service

The issue is set forth by the United States District Court,
Southern District in the Order of Judge Richard Owen dated March 16, 1990
as follows:
1.

Ordered

that the

Arbitrator,

action

Eric J.

is remanded to

Schmertz to clarify

whether the arbitration award of Arbitrator
[Theodore

W. ]

Kheel

required

that

the. .. employees be paid in the event that
the Company did not recover from the Board
of Education."
Hearings were held on October 30, 31 and November 1, 1991 at
which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a

stenographic record was taken; and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.

Earlier, in remanding the matter to the District Court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said that the award
"fail(ed) to make the Arbitrator's intent clear."

The Court stated:

"The award provides no clear instruction as to what to
do if the Company's claim was not satisfied.

When an

arbitration award provides no clear instruction as to
how a court asked to enforce the award should proceed,
the

Court

guidance.

should

remand

to

the

arbitrator

for

See Olympia & York Florida Equity Corp. v.

Gould, 776F.2d 42(2d Cir. 1985); Americas Ins. Company
v. Seagull Compania Naviera, S.A., 775F.2d 64, 67 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("a court should not attempt to enforce an
award that is ambiguous or indefinite")

(emphasis

added).
Based on the remand of the Circuit Court to the District Court,
the latter directs me to "clarify" Mr. Kheel's award.

It does not ask for

an interpretation of the award.
"Clarification" and "interpretation" are not synonymous.
"Clarification" requires deciding what Mr. Kheel intended his
award to mean.
"Interpretation" requires deciding what, independently, I deem
the award means.
Based on the dictionary definition and dictionary example, the
person who made the ambiguous statement is the one to clarify it.1

*The Random House Dictionary of the English Language;
Clarification; To make clear, intelligible, to free
from ambiguity.
(continued...)

That

is

distinguished

from

the

dictionary examples of "interpretation."

dictionary

definition and

"To interpret"

allows for a

different forum or someone other than the person responsible

for the

ambiguity to give it an unambiguous meaning.2
In my over thirty

years as an arbitrator, it has been my

unvaried experience that the clarification of an ambiguous award, like its
modification or correction, is for the original arbitrator.
Hence, in this case I conclude that my authority under the
Court's Order and remand to "clarify," is confined to finding out what Mr.
Kheel intended.

My authority does not extend to my interpretation of his

award on its face or to interpret it based on the beliefs and testimony of
others as to what they think it was supposed to mean, or should mean, or
even, specifically, to resolving the conflicting testimony on whether or
not there had been some agreement on what Mr. Kheel was to award.

l(...continued)

Example:

2The

After her Professor clarified his
statement, she understood what he
had meant." (Emphasis added)

Random House Dictionary of the English Language;

Interpretation; The act of interpreting; an
understanding or conception of another's words; an
explanation of the meaning of another's artistic or
creative work.
Examples: "The actor interpreted Lear as a
weak, raging psychopath."
"His interpretation of the poem is
rather ambiguous."

"To interpret the hidden meaning of
a parable."
"To interpret a reply as
favorable." (Emphasis added)

Such testimony and evidence, no matter how credible, do not tell
me what Mr. Kheel intended.
Mr. Kheel is the only one possessing the mental processes to
definitively state what he meant.

If his award is to be "clarified," the

best, indeed the only one who can provide the clarifying answers is Mr.
Kheel himself.

He cannot do it now as the arbitrator because, as the

Circuit Court ruled, he is no longer the impartial chairman, and because
his authority as arbitrator was not reinstated for that purpose.

But he

is not mentally or physically disabled, nor judicially enjoined from
offering

probative

testimony

on what

he

intended

when

he was

the

arbitrator.
At the arbitration hearing and under Oath, on direct and crossexamination, Mr. Kheel repeatedly and unequivocally stated that he meant,
and that therefore his award intended, that the employees are to be paid
despite the fact that the Company did not recover from the Board of Education.3

3Pertinent

Coloquy

On direct examination;
Q.

(By Mr. Groarke)
Now,
even
even
from

A.

was it your intent that the men be paid
if the Board of Education did not —
if the Company did not receive money
the Board of Education in their lawsuit?

(By Mr. Kheel)
It was my interpretation of the collective
bargaining contract that the Company's
obligation was unconditional. (Tr. pg. 31)

Q.

And was your interpretation that the
collective bargaining agreement was
commingled with the commercial contract
between the Company and the Board of
Education?
(continued...)

4

3(...continued)

A.

...Nothing in the collective bargaining
contract made it dependent upon the Board of
Education contract and visa versa. What the
reality was is that the Company was
obligated, in my opinion, and I so awarded to
pay the employees under the collective
bargaining contract, but did not
immediately...! decided to give the Company
time to collect from the Board of Education
before it had to pay out the money, a rather
substantial sum. It was not my intention to
make the award conditional.

Q.

When you say "conditional" you mean
conditional upon the Company's success in its
lawsuit against the Board of Education?

A.

That is correct.

(Tr. pg 31, 32.)

On cross-examination;
Q.

(By Mr. Rosenthal)
What happened between the time you sent out
the draft award and the time you wrote the
last paragraph?

A.

(By Mr. Kheel)
I don't recall specifically, but I do know
that you were complaining about the draft
award because you were unhappy about having
to pay the money out in advance. And you
kept telling me that you were certain you
were going to collect, that you had a very
strong case; and that you were entitled to
it; and that you felt you were going to win.
And I decided as an accommodation to provide
in my award that it be stayed so that you,
the Company, wouldn't have to pay the money
until you get a decision.
Now, I didn't know at that time, and it
wouldn't have made any difference, that you
had filed the claim with the wrong agent of
the Board of Education. It would have been
ridiculous for me to make an award
conditional on how component [sic] (i.e.
"competent") you were in pressing your claim
against the Board of Education. That would
have been the height of stupidity. I made an
(continued...)

That constitutes the requisite clarification and I make it my
Award.
The Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman,

under

bargaining agreement between the above-named parties,

the

collective

and having duly

heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
AWARD:
Based on Mr. Kheel's testimony under Oath as to the
meaning and intent of his award, I find that his award
is clarified to mean that the employees are to be paid
in the event that the Company did not recover from the
Board of Education.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

March 11, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my Award.

3(...continued)

unconditional award, but I stayed it to give
you time to do your thing and to
collect...(Tr. pg. 73, 75.)
6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK BUS TOURS, INC., PAROCHIAL
BUS SYSTEMS, INC., d/b/a NEW YORK
BUS SERVICE
Plaintiff,
OPINION AND ORDER
85 Civ. 4724 (RO)

- vTHEODORE W. KHEEL,
Defendant,
SONNY HALL, as President of the
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA,
LOCAL 100,
Intervenor-Defendant

Appearances
Bondy & Schloss
Attorneys for Plaintiff
6 East 43rd Street
New York, New York 10017
Of Counsel: Joseph S. Rosenthal
Jacqueline I. Meyer
Colleran, O'Hara & Mills
Attorney for Intervenor-Defendant
1225 Franklin Avenue
Suite 450
Garden City, New York 11530
Of Counsel: Edward J. Groarke

OPINION AND ORDER

Owen. District Judge:
Over twelve years ago, on October 18, 1979, arbitrator Theodore W. Kheel issued
an Opinion and Award to resolve whether bus drivers employed by New York Bus Tours,
Inc. were entitled to compensation for a period of three months during which they were out
of work due to a wild-cat s l i i k e that led ihe bus company to close down operations. His
opinion, in major pail, read as follows:
The evidence demonstrates (hat the Company and Union as well as the
83 employees here claiming to be paid were ready, willing and able to provide
bus service throughout the dmation of the wild-cat strike but were prevented
because of an event over which neither the Company, the Union nor the
employees had any control, namely the efforts of persons involved in the
strike to prevent the Company's buses from operating. The employees
reported for work and were paid initially. Together with the Company, they
attempted to provide service. The Company's officials consulted the Board
and tin; Police and concluded, on Ihe basis of the advice and information they
received, (hat it would not be possible to operate the buses. The employees
and their Union continued Ihiouglioul the duration of the strike to indicate
their availability to work but the circumstances growing out of the strike
prevented the Company from resuming service.
In my opinion, all of the conditions entitling the Company to
compensation under the piovision of its contract with the Board of Education
sel forth above are here present. The Company and its employees were
ready, willing and able to provide service and attempted to provide service
but were prevented from providing service by an event over which neither the
Company, the Union, nor the employees had any control. The circumstances
were directly comparable to an emergency closing of the school by the Board
of Education due to weather or other conditions. Since the practice of the
parties pursuant to that provision is clear and established by the record and
the conditions under which the Company becomes entitled to compensation
are present, I must and do hereby hold that the employees are entitled to be
paid for the time they lost during the wild-cat strike.
Since my decision is based on the practice established by the parties
pursuant to the Board's obligation to the Company, I hereby stay enforcement
of my award pending satisfaction of the Board's obligation to the Company.
J have been assured by the Company that it will proceed promptly to enforce
its claim against the Board, that it has filed notice of its claim with the Board

and that it is commencing suit against the Board. Nevertheless, I am
retaining jurisdiction to make certain that all measures are taken to assure
prompt enforcement.
Opinion and Award. Impartial Chairman. Theodore W. Khecl, at 3-4 (October 18,
1979)(New York Bus I). Unfortunately, as events would have it, the Company did not
properly notice its claim on the Board of Education and the New York Court of Appeals
dismissed the Company's action. Parochial Bus Systems Inc.. et al. v. The Board of
Education of the City of New York. 470 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568 (Ct.App. 1983)(New York Bus
II).
Thereafter, in its first appearance before me, following the intervention of the
Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100 and the removal to Federal Court, the
Company argued that the language in arbitrator Kheel's Opinion staying the decision
constituted a determination that the award was contingent upon the Company's success in
its suit against the Board of Rducalion, and that since the Company had been unsuccessful,
it owed nothing to the employees.

I did not read Kheel's Opinion to say this at all,

concluding that the statement, "I must and do hereby hold that the employees are entitled
to be paid for the lime they lost during (he wild-cat strike", was in no way an expression
that the employees' compensation was contingent upon the Company's recovery from the
Board, and the decision to "... stay enforcement of my award pending satisfaction of the
Board's obligation to the Company", was merely a statement of the parties' practice that
payment of the compensation could await resolution of the Company's action against the
Board at which time, it was assumed, it, the Company, would come into funds to pay the
employees. See Ne^Yoik Bus Toms. Inc. v. Theodore W. Kheel and Sonny Mall. 85 Civ.
4724 (RO), at 'I (S.D.N.Y. December I. l«85) (Amended Opinion, March 25, 1986 at 45)(New York Bus 111). Kheel's Opinion certainly did not suggest that the employees' right
3

to back pay was at the mercy of a mortal procedural gaffe by the Company's attorneys.
Accordingly, I remanded the case for further arbitration to determine the amount of back
wages.

Because by this time Kheel's powers as arbitrator had expired pursuant to

stipulations of the parties, I directed that the arbitration as to the amount of compensation
due the employees should proceed before the newly designated Impartial Arbitrator.
In accordance with that direction, the new arbitrator, Eric Schmertz, conducted a
hearing and issued an Opinion and Award dated December 14, 1987 awarding the
employees back pay, plus interest, in the amount of $375,956. I granted the Union's motion
to confirm and enforce this award and ordered the Company to pay the Union on behalf
of the employees. New York Bus Tours. Inc. v. Theodore W. Kheel and Sonny Hall, 85
Civ. 4724 (RO) (S.D.N.Y. April 18, 1988)(Ncw York Bus IV). The Company appealed and
the Court of Appeals reversed. It reasoned that, "[i]n light of the facts that Kheel felt the
employees were entitled to be paid and that he stayed enforcement to allow the Company
to seek payment by the Board, it is not at all clear what Kheel intended in the event the
Company was not paid by the Board", New York Bus Tours v. Theodore W. Kheel and.
Sonny Hall. 864 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1988)(New York Bus V). and, accordingly, vacated and
remanded with instructions to remand to "the arbitrator" to clarify whether the award
required that the employees be paid regardless of the success of the Company's success in
its action against the Board. Id. at 12-13.
On receipt of the Court of Appeals' mandate to remand to "the arbitrator", over the
Company's objection, I remanded the action to Kheel, the arbitrator who authored the
award, in accordance with what I understood arbitration practice to be when an award
requires clarification, see discussion p. 5, infra, and directed that he answer the following
certified question: "Was it your intent in the October 18, 1979 Opinion and Award to
4

require lite Company to pay the affected employees' wages and benefits in the event the
Company was not compensated for the period of the wildcat strike (February 20 through
May 10, 1979) by the New York City Board of Education?" New York Bus Tours, Inc. v.
Theodore W. Klieel and Sonny Hall. 85 Civ. 4724 (RO) (S.D.N.Y. January 27, 1989)(New
York Bus VI). Kheel submitted a Clarification and answered the certified question stating,
"It was my intent in the October 17, 1979 Opinion and Award to require the Company to
pay the affected employees' wages and benefits in the event the Company was not
compensated for the period of the wildcat strike (February 20 through May 10, 1979) by the
New York City Board of Education." Thereupon, I granted the Union's motion to confirm
and enforce the Opinion and Award of arbitrator Schmertz, and entered a judgment
ordering the Company to pay the Union now $400,378 on behalf of the employees. New
York Bus Tours. Inc. v. Theodore W. Kheel and Sonny Hall. 85 Civ. 4724 (RO) (S.D.N.Y.
March 8, 1989)(New York Bus VII).
The Company appealed again. The Court of Appeals again reversed, ruling that I
had erred in interpreting its instructions to remand to "the arbitrator" for clarification, by
remanding the matter to arbitrator Klieel rather than arbitrator Schmertz, as Kheel no
longer had jurisdiction to decide any matter in this action. The Court of Appeals remanded
a second time with instructions to remand the matter to arbitrator Schmertz stating:
We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court enforcing the
award, and remand with instructions that the matter be remanded to
Arbitrator Eric J. Schmertz to clarify whether the arbitration award required
that the employees be paid in the event that the Company did not recover
from the Board. There is no basis for this court to suggest to Schmertz how
he should proceed to clarify the award.
New York Bus Tours v. Theodore W. Kheel and Sonny Hall. 89-7289 (2d Cir. Nov. 29,
1989) (New York Bus VIII).

Accordingly, I remanded to arbitrator Schmertz to clarify whether the arbitration
award of arbitrator Kheel required that the employees be paid. New York Bus Tours v.
Theodore VV. Kheel and Sonny Hall. 85 Civ. 4724 (RO) (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 1990)(New
York Bus IX). Pursuant to this, Schmertz held hearings over three days, October 30, 31,
and November 1, 1991, at which the Company and the Union presented evidence, including
the testimony of Kheel who, not unexpectedly, I am sure, stated that it was his intent that
the employees be paid unconditionally even if the Company was not paid by the Board.
Thereafter, on March 1 1, 1992, Schmertz issued an Opinion and Award stating:
Based on Mr. Kheel's testimony under Oath as to the meaning and
intent of liis award, I find that his award is clarified to mean that the
employees are to be paid in the event that the Company did not recover from
the Board of Education.
Chairman. liricJ. Schmertz at 6 (March 11, 1992)(New York
Bus X). Schmertz expressly rejected the Company's demand that he. independently of
Kheel's input determine what Kheel's 1979 Award meant, stating:
In my over thirty-years as an arbitrator, it has been my unvaried
experience that the clarification of an ambiguous award, like its modification
or correction, is for the original arbitrator.
Hence, in this case I conclude that my authority under the Court's
Order and remand to 'clarify,' is confined to finding out what Mr. Kheel
intended. My authority does not extend to my interpretation of his award on
its face or to interpret it based on the beliefs and testimony of others as to
what they think it was supposed to mean, or should mean, or even,
specifically, to resolving the conflicting testimony on whether or not there
had been some agreement on what Mr. Kheel was to award.
«
»
«
Mr. Kheel is the only one possessing the mental processes to
definitively state what h_e meant. If his award is to be 'clarified,' the best,
indeed the only one who can provide the clarifying answers is Mr. Kheel
himself.
New York Bus X at 3-4.
The Company now moves to vacate this most recent award rendered by Schmertz

asserting that he acted in "manifest disregard of the law" when he permitted Kheel to testify
as to his intent and arguing that the "clarification" by Schmertz should not have been based
upon such testimony of Kheel because the Court of Appeals had previously held that Kheel
did not have jurisdiction to clarify the issue himself. In this regard I agree with arbitrator
Schmertz that although Kheel no longer has jurisdiction to decide any matters in this action
as an arbitrator, there was no bar to his testifying as a fact witness, under oath and subject
to cross-examination, and any testimony that he so provided, if credited, could be used by
the current arbitrator in carrying out his duty to clarify Kheel's original award. See New
York Bus X at 4 ("[Kheel] cannot do it now as the arbitrator because, as the Circuit court
ruled, he is no longer the impartial chairman, and because his authority as arbitrator was
not reinstated for that purpose. But he is not mentally or physically disabled, nor judicially
enjoined from offering probative testimony on what he intended when he was the
arbitrator.") Schmertz approached his obligations on the remand exactly as he should have
and as he was specifically directed to do by the Court of Appeals, see p. 4 supra. In
specific language the Court directed him to clarify Kheel's award, not decide de_ novo, and
expressly refrained from suggesting how he should proceed to so clarify. Thus, the purpose
of the remand being to determine what Kheel meant in his original Opinion, clearly the
best way -- and indeed the only way -- was to get this information directly from the horse's
mouth. See Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen. 624 F.2d 1255, 1264 (5th Cir. 1980).
The present position of the Company would force this case into a Victorian garden
maze which has no exit. However, the exit from the garden maze is. in view. Schmertz did
clarify any ambiguity that existed; the departure from the maze should proceed
expeditiously and the employees who have waited over ten years to recover should finally
be paid.
7

Accordingly, the Union's cross-motion to confirm and enforce the Opinion and
Award of Eric J. Schmertz dated March 11, 1992 clarifying the Opinion and Award of
Theodore W. Kheel dated October 18, 1979 is granted. The motion of New York Bus
Tours, Inc. for an order vacating the award is denied.
Submit order and judgment accordingly.
DatedrJune
, 1992
New York, New York

fy*v^ \
United States District Judge
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA -ANDNEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD

Local IOO, Transport Workers Union
of America
and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the termination of Clarence Hill?
If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on November 3, I992 at which time Mr. Hill, hereinafter
referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was
waived. The parties filed post-hearing memoranda.
The grievant was discharged for a cumulative disciplinary record of warnings and
suspensions for "accidents" and "reckless driving" and other rule violations,
culminating in allegations of "reckless driving" and a "failure to report an accident"
on October I, I992.
Relevant is the grievant's most recent prior suspension of fourteen days for

1

"failure to report an accident." That suspension, which began as a discharge, is based
on an Agreement between the Company and the Union and accepted by the grievant. It
reads:
AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT, made this 18th day of June, 1992 by and among
PAROCHIAL BUS SYSTEM, INC. and NEW YORK BUS TOURS, INC.
(hereinafter "New York Bus"), TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, LOCAL 100, AFL-CIO (hereinafter "Union") and
CLARENCE C. HILL
WHEREAS, the Union commenced an arbitration proceeding claiming that New York Bus did not have just cause to discharge CLARENCE
C. HILL; and
WHEREAS, the parties have settled the grievance giving rise to said
arbitration proceeding;
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1. The termination of Clarence C. Hill effective June 5, 1992 shall
be reduced to a suspension without pay for fourteen (14) days.
2. Mr. Hill shall be reinstated to his former position of employment
effective June 20, 1992.
3. Should Mr. Hill in the future fail to fully comply with the outstanding rules and regulations of New York Bus relating to the reporting of accidents, the Company shall have the right to terminate
his employment forthwith.
Prior to that suspension and Agreement, and over his period of employment
from latter 1983 until his discharge in October 1992, the grievant's disciplinary
record also includes a seven day disciplinary suspension in August/September 1991 for
violation of the no-strike clause of the contract, a three day suspension because of an
accident in March 1991 and numerous warnings and notices for chargeable accidents
and driving offenses.
Accordingly, up to the charged incidents of October 1, 1992, the Company had
imposed discipline on the grievant progressively for offenses generally violative of his

required duties as a bus driver, and more particularly, relevant to the October 1 st
allegations. Hence, though the October 1st incident if proved, may not be grounds for
discharge standing alone, they are, against the backdrop of his entire record, including
the final paragraph of the Agreement of June 18, 1992, offenses which would properly
trigger his discharge as the final penalty of the progressive discipline sequence.
The record adequately supports the Company's case. The grievant is charged
with reckless driving on 11 6th Street. More specifically, he is charged with driving at
an excessive speed, causing serious injury to one passenger and causing other
passengers to be thrown upward from their seats when his bus hit and passed through a
depression or "sink" in the road. The evidence on this incident is clear, based on the
testimony by two passengers who were on the bus. That one passenger was injured and
had to be taken from the location to a hospital by ambulance, is not disputed.
The grievant's explanation that he was not speeding and did not know of and did
not see the depression in the road, is unacceptable. The evidence shows that this was not
his first use of 11 6th Street and that the road condition was the same previously as on
October 1 st. More important is the obvious fact that to cause most if not all the
passengers to be thrown upward from their seats (as testified to by the passengers) and
the serious injury to one passenger, the bus had to be traveling at a speed well in excess
of a rate reasonable or prescribed for a City street. I accept as accurate and relevant
the additional testimony of a passenger that previously the grievant was speeding on the
FDR Drive and turned at high speed off the Drive and on to 11 6th Street.
Because of his prior disciplinary record of many warnings and admonitions
about his driving, the grievant had a duty and was on notice, to exercise care. That he
drove so fast on 11 6th Street as to cause passenger dislocation and one passenger's
serious injury, is a manifest disregard of what is reasonably expected of any driver of a

bus carrying public passengers, and also for the grievant a manifest disregard of
warnings and discipline he previously received.
Also, in a not insubstantial way, he was not forthright about the accident he had
on October 1 st. The evidence on that incident and circumstance is also supportive of the
Company's charge.
I am satisfied that upon pulling into a bus stop at Castle Hill, the grievant struck
and his bus became entangled with an abandoned car. I credit as accurate the testimony
of a passenger that the grievant had trouble moving the bus out of the bus stop; that he
got out of the bus several times and went to the outside rear of the bus, apparently to
see what was interfering with the exiting of the bus from that stop. I do not accept the
grievant's testimony that he got out of the bus only once, observed the rear side of the
bus from the front of the bus, and was not aware of having hit the abandoned car.
hdisputedly, the rear side of the bus was damaged. In view of what I deem as the
credible testimony of the passenger and because it would be the logical thing for the
grievant to do, I conclude not only that he hit the car, but went to the rear of the bus
more than once, saw and knew of the damaged caused to the bus.
The grievant's "failure to report (that) accident" took the form of his conduct
upon returning to the garage. He did not, as he should have, immediately disclose the
damage and reveal its cause. In what I must construe was an effort to confuse if not an
attempt to avoid any responsibility or liability, he asked supervision if "there was a
report of any damage to the bus." The testimony of the Assistant Superintendent of
Maintenance on this point is essentially conceded by the grievant. As I have concluded
that the grievant knew he had hit the abandoned car and saw the damage caused to the
bus, I see no logical or acceptable reason why he would ask if there was "any report of
damage to the bus" except to divert responsibility from himself. Also, he concedes that

in response to the Superintendent's question of whether he had an accident because the
damage was "new", he replied "I'm not sure, there was an abandoned car at the Castle
Hill area." Again, as I have concluded that he knew he had caused the damage, that
answer was not fully forthcoming but rather designed it seems to me, as another attempt
to avoid the blame. That the grievant showed the damage to the Superintendent is
immaterial because even at that point he did not acknowledge his responsibility.

He

thereafter filled out an accident report accurately stating that his bus hit the car. But
that does not cure these earlier efforts at obfuscation. It is undisputed that the Company
rules require that a driver report an accident immediately upon his return to the
garage. Under these findings and circum stances I am compelled to hold that though he
was under an express duty from the Agreement of June 18, 1992 "to fully comply with
the rules and regulations of New York Bus relating to the reporting of accidents," he
failed to comply with those rules with the requisite promptness and truthfulness.
Accordingly, the incidents of October 1, I992 have been proved to my
satisfaction. Considering the grievant's prior record, and especially the Agreement of
June 18, 1992 under which he was given a final chance to comply with Company rules
regarding accidents, the October 1 st events constitute legitimate grounds to trigger the
grievant's discharge as the final penalty in a properly imposed progressive discipline
sequence.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective bargaining agreement
between the parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following AWARD;

There was just cause for the termination of Clarence Hill.

,€ric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: November 2 5 , 1 9 9 2
STATE OF New York :
COUNTY OF New York :
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the
individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA - and- NEW YORK
BUS SERVICE
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OPINION AND AWARD

Local 100, Transport Workers Union
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New York Bus Service
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The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Ronald Arnold?

If

not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on November 12, 1992 at which time Mr.
Arnold, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Employer appeared. All concerned were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant, a bus driver, was discharged for his overall
disciplinary record culminating in charges of driving violations

on

October 8, 1992.
The issue is not whether the charges of October 8, 1992, if
proved, constitute in and of themselves grounds for dismissal.
not.

They do

Rather, it is whether those charges, against the back-drop of the

grievant's entire disciplinary record, properly constitute the triggering
events for the imposition of discharge as the ultimate penalty in a
progressive discipline seguence.
The grievant's prior disciplinary record is replete with various
violations.

He has been placed on notice and warned for poor attendance,

chargeable accidents, reckless driving, and passenger complaints about his
driving.

On more than one occasion, he was suspended and/or placed on

final warning for various offenses.

Most relevant are his appearances as

the grievant in three prior disciplinary cases before this Impartial
Chairman.
In August
attendance.

of

I reduced

1983, the
that

Employer

discharge

discharged

him

to a disciplinary

for poor
suspension

because, as the then new Impartial Chairman I decided to use that case to
establish a precedent for that and other subsequent, similar matters.

I

used that case to serve notice on the parties that except for disciplinary
offenses justifying summary dismissal, I would require the Employer to
follow the well-settled disciplinary procedure of progressive discipline.
And for that reason I gave him a final opportunity to achieve and maintain
a satisfactory attendance record.
In May

of 1989,

reckless driving.

I reversed

the grievant's suspension for

That charge was based on letters of complaints from

pedestrians but none of the pedestrians testified at the arbitration.

In

my opinion, I stated:
"This is not to say that the complaining
regarding

the

grievant's

recklessness

letters

toward

the

pedestrians are untrue, but rather that the letters
alone do not constitute the type of evidence required
to

meet

the

requisite

standard

of

"clear

and

convincing" evidence.
The foregoing two decisions established two arbitral rules.
First,

that

progressive

discipline must

be

followed

in non-summary

dismissible cases, and second, that complaining witnesses should testify
in person and be subject to cross-examination.

In November 1991, I upheld the grievant's five-day suspension
for erratic and negligent driving.

In that case I accepted as credible

the in person testimony of the Employer's Superintendent of Transportation
who observed the grievant's wrongful driving at impermissible high speed.
Also I upheld the suspension because it succeeded other disciplinary
notices and warnings for prior violations of the same type.
In the foregoing opinion I stated:
In

view

includes

of

his

prior

a number

disciplinary

record

which

of accidents and warnings

for

driving errors and one suspension in 1982 for wrongful
driving,

I do not

find

it unreasonable

Employer to have concluded that with the
incident, his negligent driving continued.

for the
instant

Therefore,

I do not find that a disciplinary suspension of five
days was either harsh or unreasonable.
Obviously, the November 1991 decision was based not only on a
finding of fact that the grievant drove improperly, but because there was
in person testimony by the witness who observed that driving.

And also

based on the fact that the suspension was the appropriate next step in the
progressive discipline sequence.
Both latter requirements have been met in the instant case. The
grievant is charged with impolite and belligerent conduct to a passenger;
reckless driving on Fifth Avenue; speeding in taking a turn through an
intersection with a pedestrian crossing; failure to stop at a prescribed
bus stop; and instead of stopping at that bus stop, continuing down the
road at an excessive speed.
The charge of rude conduct to a passenger has not been proved.
The testimony discloses that the passenger and the grievant engaged in a

conversation
applicable.

regarding

when

the

reduced

senior

citizen

fare

was

The passenger believed that at 4:40 P.M. she was entitled to

board and ride the bus at the reduced senior citizen fare.

The grievant

properly told her that the fare at that hour was the full fare of $3.75.
Though there was a continuing exchange between them, I do not find, based
on the testimony,

that the grievant's attitude or demeanor rose to the

level of rudeness or belligerence.
However, based on the in person testimony of the passenger as
well as the in person testimony of a Company supervisor, I am persuaded
that the other charges against the grievant are factual as the Employer
asserts.

And that as a continuation of the grievant's record of wrongful

driving qualify as a proper "trigger" for his dismissal on his entire
disciplinary record.
The passenger testified that travelling down Fifth Avenue, the
grievant drove at approximately 40 miles an hour; changed lanes abruptly
several times; blew his horn "at everyone" and braked abruptly and
repeatedly.

She concluded that never before had a bus on which she was a

passenger been driven that fast and so maneuvered on Fifth Avenue, and
that the experience was "stressful" with "too much anxiety."

I find no

reason why the passenger would falsify her testimony or misrepresent the
nature of the trip on Fifth Avenue.
Later that day, seated in a bus which followed the grievant's
bus, Supervisor, Alvin Oteri testified that he saw the grievant approach
the intersection of Einstein Loop and Co-Op City Boulevard.
that the grievant's bus engine was "revving"
at an excessive speed.

He testified

and that the turn was made

He stated that the prescribed speed should have

been no more than five miles an hour, particularly
involved passing through a pedestrian cross-walk.

because the turn

He judged the grievant

made the turn at 25 miles an hour with the bus engine still "revving" at
a high rpm.

He went on to testify that instead of moving to the right and

stopping at the bus stop on that corner, the grievant not only did not
stop but did not slow down and continued down that road still at an
excessive speed.
I accept as accurate Mr. Oteri's testimony just as I accepted in
the earlier decision
Transportation.

the testimony

of the Company's

Supervision of

Again, there is nothing in the record upon which one

could or should conclude that Mr. Oteri falsified his testimony or did not
observe what he said he saw.
point is equivocal.

Indeed the grievant's testimony on this

First he testified that he did stop at the bus stop

for "a second," and then for "2-3 seconds," but could not state whether he
opened the bus door as required.

He then attempted to justify his action

by asserting that there were no passengers on the bus to be discharged and
there were no passengers standing at the bus stop to get on the bus.
It has not been shown that a driver may be excused from stopping
at a bus stop just because he thinks there are no passengers leaving the
bus or planning to enter the bus.
Though

I conclude

from the disputed

testimony

that Oteri

testified accurately when he stated that the grievant did not stop at all
at the bus stop, there is no acceptable evidence to refute his testimony
that

the

grievant

made a turn

into the

intersection

and across a

pedestrian cross-walk at an excessive speed and continued at an excessive
speed as he travelled from the bus stop.
As I have observed many times before, this Employer has a
"fiduciary"

duty

to

the

riding public

it transports.

Just

as a

manufacturing enterprise applies "quality control" procedures before its
products are made available to the public, so, too, may this Employer take

every reasonable step to insure the safety of its buses and the safe
operation of those buses by its drivers.

Indeed, it has a duty to do so.

Quality control is preventative. It not only permits the manufacturer to
minimize his liabilities for dangerous products, but also protects those
who use the product.

Similarly, I find that this Employer may follow and

take preventive measures to insure not only the safety of its equipment
but safe driving by its drivers.

Bluntly, I do not find nor would I

require this Employer to wait until there is a major accident before it
takes steps to remove from its employ a driver whose record shows a
propensity for accidents, driving violations, and other infractions of
operating rules and procedures.
reached

The situation with the grievant has

the point where because of his extensive

record

of driving

violations; because he has been put in notice by warnings and suspensions
for

these

particular

violations,

and

because,

as

the

instant

case

indicates, his propensity to commit operating violations has continued, I
have no choice but to uphold the discharge.
As part of the record, the Union has submitted certain letters
of commendations which the Company gave to the grievant.

The grievant is

to be commended for the actions and services which prompted these letters.
However, two date back to 1982 and one to 1985.

The last, in March of

1988 concerns a circumstance not related to driving.

The first three pre-

dated many of the grievant's violations, including particularly, my
decision of November 25, 1991.

Unfortunately, neither in specificity nor

in sufficient quantity do those four letters of commendation provide any
basis for a different conclusion about the grievant's record nor can they,
at this point, serve in mitigation.

In sum, when juxtaposed with the

grievant's overall disciplinary record and his continued violations of

driving regulations, those letters show that out of the jaws of potential
victory he has snatched defeat.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman of the collective bargaining
agreement between the above-named parties and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of said parties makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Ronald Arnold was for just cause.

Impartial Chairman
DATED:

December 23, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :
)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
BETWEEN
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 30, I.U.O.E.
CASE NO. 13-300-0086-292
AND
NICHOLAS PEPE, WESTCHESTER I

The dispute involves the application of the following provision of Article XXII GENERAL
of the collective bargaining agreement:
The Company shall provide ... parking facilities for employees cars on job
site.
and the grievance of David McHale relating thereto.
A hearing was held on October 27, 1992 at which time Mr. McHale, hereinafter
referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company
appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

At the outset of the hearing the parties stipulated the issue as follows:
Was there just cause for the discipline of David McHale? If not what shall be the
remedy?

However, the parties disagree over the scope of that issue. The Company asserts it
is limited to the propriety of the two day suspension it imposed on the grievant. The Union
agrees that that question is in dispute, but also claims that the issue and grievance include the
1

"withdrawal of parking privileges" from the grievant and the reprimand letter placed by the
Company in his file for claiming he paid for parking "under harassment. "
Consequently the scope of the issue is for the Arbitrator to determine.
Company employees are given a plastic "key" card which has two uses. It activates
the gate

of the parking garage in the Company's building. Thus it is used by employees to

gain access to the garage with their cars in implementation of the

foregoing contract

provision granting them free parking . The card is also used as a "key" to open and enter
doors into the Company's building.
The grievant suffers from epilepsy. He does not and never has had a drivers license,
and does not own a car. It is the Company's contention that he is therefore not eligible for the
parking benefit. And that his plastic "key" card may not be used by anyone else or any car to
enter or park in the garage even to transport the grievant to work or to pick him up to take
him home at the end of the work day.
For many years, the grievant, his mother and father have followed the following
procedure.

The grievant may come to work or go home with his father. In that event there

is no problem because his father is also an employee of the Company, has his own "key" card
and is entitled to park his car in the garage. But because the grievant and his father at times
work different hours, he cannot travel both ways with his father at all times.
therefore the grievant is brought to work or taken home by his mother.

Many times

In that case, the

grievant's "key" card is used to enable his mother and her car to enter the garage . Though
she is not a Company employee, the days she brings the grievant to work, or takes him home,
she parks her car in the garage for the entire or a portion of the day while she is at her office
at the Internal Revenue Service in White Plains.

When the grievant comes to work with his father but doesn't go home with him, his
mother enters the garage later in the day, parks her car, and later picks up her son at the end
of his shift and takes him home.
It is this varied use of the grievant's key card by this mother when her car is parked
in the garage, that the Company objects to, claiming that that is not in compliance with the
contractual benefit of according free parking 'for an employee's car."

But rather, argues the

Company, it amounts to free parking for the grievant's mother. The Company also claims that
the grievant's mother has used his card to gain free parking in the garage for herself at times
when she neither brings him to work nor takes him home.
The dispute arose when the Company invalidated the grievant's card for parking.
When his card did not activate access to the garage, the grievant and his father complained to
Michael Giordano, the Company's Assistant Building Manager. The content of the discussions
between Giordano and the McHales is sharply contradictatory. The Company asserts that the
grievant was told that his card was not any longer to be used for parking under any
circumstances because the car(s) involved were not his and he had no drivers license.
On one or two days immediately thereafter, the grievant's card was again used, and
access to the garage was gained. However, on two days subsequently, the card would not work
at the garage, and the grievant (driven by his father, but using the grievant's card) paid the
$9 daily parking fee required of the public. He protested this payment by signing the parking
ticket as "paid under harrassment."
The Company deemed the grievant's use and efforts to use his card after the meeting
with Giordano as a willful disregard of instructions and hence insubordination. For that the
Company imposed the two day suspension. For claiming that he twice paid the $9 fee "under

harassment" the Company placed a reprimand letter in his file.
electronically and permanently

And, the Company

invalidated the grievant's "key" card for use in the garage,

prompting the Union's objection to that action in this case.
As there is no disagreement that the two day suspension has been placed in issue in
this case, that disciplinary action can be dealt with without resolving the dispute over the
scope of the grievance.
I find the evidence of the discussions between Giordano and the McHales to be
unclear, offsetting and hence inconclusive Giordano asserts that he told the McHales that the
grievant's key card was not to be used for the garage. The testimony by and in behalf of the
grievant is that Giordano said that the grievant's card could be used "if the grievant was in the
car" and that he also said, in the face of the complaint initiated by the McHales, that"there
should be no problem in the future" with the use of the grievant's card . There were no
independent witnesses or participants to the conversations. With the burden on the Company
to prove its case clearly and convincingly, I am not persuaded that it has met that standard
regarding what Giordano in fact said. Surprisingly, on such an important matter, and in view
of a contrary practice for many years the Company did not follow up what it claims were
verbal instructions by a written memorandum to the grievant, his father, or the Union.
Failing to do so, the testimony of what was said remains inconclusive one way or the other,
and fails to meet the Company's evidentiary burden.
Moreover, that the grievant and his father used and then attempted to use the
grievant's card on days following their talks with Giordano, suggests to me that either they
were not told that the card couldn't be used when the grievant was being transported to or
from work, or that that instruction was not communicated by Giordano clearly and
unequivocally. Both McHales had good work records and I am not persuaded that they would
have purposefully defied orders, thereby risking discipline.

Instead, and because the senior

McHale is a Union Steward, I think that they would have grieved, rather than engage in "selfhelp."
Accordingly, the two day suspension for "insubordination" or defying orders, was
unjustified, and must be reversed .
Deciding the scope of the grievance is not made easy by the fact that the contract does
not require a written grievance, nor does it contain a formal grievance procedure. Article XVI
Grievance Procedure

simply permits a grievance "concerning the interpretation,

application or performance of this Agreement" to go directly to arbitration. Absent formal
written grievances and grievance steps, the opportunity to define and identify the details of
the grievance is not readily available.

Here, the Union through its attorney, filed for

arbitration with the American Arbitration Association a dispute identified as "The suspension
of David McHale at the 44 South Broadway location."

That identification was thereafter

tracked and repeated by the Association in its correspondence with the parties.
On the other hand however, both McHale's wrote letters to the Union's business
agent and business manager . Both letters opened with the statement "I am filing this
grievance..." (emphasis added). Cumulatively, these letters protested not only the grievant's
suspension but also the letter of reprimand and the invalidation of the grievant's key card for
parking. In the absence of a defining grievance procedure, I am not prepared to hold that the
"short hand" notation of the dispute in the letter to the Arbitration Association limits the
grievance

just to that reference.

Determinative to my mind is the Union's unrefuted

testimony that the McHale letters were sent to the Company's labor relations representatives
and that the content of those letters were discussed in telephone conversations between a Union
representative and those Company representatives. In short, I am satisfied that the Union put
the Company on adequate notice that three complaints were encompassed within the grievance.
Again, in the absence of a contractual prescription as to how grievances are to be

written and filed, I find that the grievant's reference to "harassment" when he paid the $9
parking fee was nothing more than an inartful

method of grieving that payment and

preserving his right to seek redress. I see it as comparable to signing "under protest" or
"without prejudice." As a method of grieving, the grievant and his father had the right to so
complain,

albeit crudely.

Therefore, the reprimand letter placed in the grievant's file for

doing so, was inappropriate and unjust, and shall be expunged.

Obviously, there can be no quarrel with the Company's refusal to allow the
grievant's mother to use the garage to park while she is at her White Plains office when she
neither brings the grievant to work nor takes him home. That is a manifest misuse of the
grievant's key card, not for any benefit to the grievant, but as an exclusive, and improper
benefit for the mother. The Company may take steps to prevent that abuse.
The bare contract language is not determinative.

Though no evidence was adduced on

the negotiation history of the parking language, I am not prepared to conclude that the intent
of that language was to limit parking only to cars owned by employees, and driven by an
employee. For example, an employee may certainly use his card if he is driving a leased or
rented car. Also, as an extreme example, I believe that the benefit of parking is available to
an employee who is chauffeured to and from work, and where the chauffeured car is parked in
the garage during the in-between hours, provided the chauffer is engaged exclusively and
solely for the employee's benefit. In those examples, the use of the card to enter the garage to
park the vehicle in the garage would be reasonable implementations of the parking benefit, as
exclusive to and for the employee. That I conclude is the intent and purpose of the contractual
parking benefit.

In other words, it is for the employee, and for the employee exclusively.

When the grievant 's card is used by him and his mother, to gain access to and park in the
garage, either when taking him to work or taking him home, the benefit is not exclusive to
6

and for the grievant. There is a second and not inconsequential benefit, and that is for his
mother, in the form of free parking while she is at work elsewhere in White Plains.

I am

not persuaded that the contract parking benefit was intended to extend to that situation. Nor in
the absence of other contrary evidence should the arbitrator extend its coverage and meaning
that far.
This is not to say that the arbitrator does not think that there are magnanimous and
humanitarian reasons to accommodate the grievant and his disability by allowing the practice.
Indeed, I think there are. But my jurisdiction is not to fashion a humanitarian solution. That
is for the Company to consider and judge. My authority is to interpret and apply the contract.
And I see no contractual basis to sanction the use of the grievant's parking card to accord his
mother free parking for a full or partial day even when that is in conjunction with
transporting her son.
Nor is there evidence that the grievant's mother drives to White Plains and uses her
White Plains office only as an accommodation to her son. It is true that the mother works at
two IRS offices, one in Rockland County and the other in White Plains. She has not testified
nor has the Union asserted that she could do all her work in Rockland County.
her job

I conclude that

requires her to work at both locations. That being so, when she goes to White Plains,

it is not just to transport or pick up the grievant but also to work, mandatorily, at herWhite
Plains office. So, on those days, to park in the Company's garage would be a benefit to her, not
authorized by the collective agreement.
Accordingly, the Company may prohibit the use of the grievant's key pass for and under
that circumstance.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in the above matter, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
(1) The grievance covers the grievant's two day suspension; the letter of

reprimand for protesting the payment of the parking fee "under
harrassment" and the cancellation of parking privileges.
(2)

(3)

(4)

The two day suspension of David McHale is reversed. It shall be expunged from his record and he shall be made whole for the time lost.
The letter of reprimand in the grievant's file for claiming he paid the
$9 parking fee "under harrassment" shall be expunged from his
file.
The grievant's plastic "key" card may not be used by his mother to
park her car or the car she is driving in the Company garage, even
if she is driving the grievant to work and/or taking him home.

DATED: NOVEMBER, 16 1992
STATE OF NEW YORK )

Eric J. Schmertz

SS:

ARBfTRATOR

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the
individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 1109 COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS
OF AMERICA

CASE #1330000559 91

-and-

NYNEX MERIDIAN SYSTEMS

The issue is the Union's grievance charging the Company with
violation of Article XIV of the contract by its requirement that employees
provide receipts for meals costing in excess of $4.00 when said employees
are "authorized to work away from their permanent reporting place to other
geographic areas."
There is no dispute that the grievance involves employee(s) who
were authorized to work away from their permanent reporting places within
the meaning of Article XIV.
The narrow issue is whether payment of the "meal allowance"
under Section 8 of Article XIV may be conditioned by the Company on the
production of meal receipts.
A

hearing

was

held

on

December

13,

1991

at

which

time

representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived and the

parties filed post-hearing briefs.

In its entirety, Article XIV reads:
ARTICLE XIV
TRAVEL TIME. CONDITIONS AND EXPENSES
Section 1
Employees authorized to work away from their permanent reporting
place to other geographic areas will receive in addition to
their base pay the following conditions and expenses:
Section 2
Transportation to and from these locations will usually be made
by common carrier or company vehicles, with costs to be paid or
reimbursed by the Company, however, if the employee is required
to use his personal vehicle he will be paid the standard mileage
reimbursement rate specified in Article XV, Section 1.
Section 3
The Company will make all living arrangements for employees on
board and lodging assignments and those arrangements must be of
proper standard. An employee will be deemed to be on board and
lodging assignment when said assignment to a job site is outside
a sixty (60) road mile radius from both the employee's permanent
reporting point and the employee's home. If an employee elects
to return to his home using his own vehicle, he will receive
thirty-five dollars ($35.00) in lieu of any board, lodging,
mileage, and/or other per diem compensation.
Section 4
Should these temporary assignments last for more than five (5)
calendar days, such employees will be able to make phone calls
not to exceed fifteen dollars ($15.00) per week at Company's
expense; provided Company facilities will not be available after
normal business hours for usage.
Section 5
Should such assignment within the Continental United States last
four (4) weeks or longer, then such employees shall be allowed
one (1) trip home at Company's expense, on the second or third
weekend of such assignment and an additional trip home every
third weekend thereafter with transportation costs to be paid by
the Company.

Section 6
The Company will not schedule airline travel which is more than
eight (8) hours in any one day. Pay for time spent traveling
will be at straight time. Where delay or emergency occurs, pay
will not exceed eight (8) hours. When an employee requests to
use his personal vehicle, and permission is granted, average
airline travel time will be used for purposes of pay under this
Article.
Section 7
If the employee elects to go to his permanent location on either
a holiday or weekend, the employee will be allowed expenses up
to that designated as his standard per diem; or alternatively,
no more than the actual cost to maintain the employee during
this time away from the permanent location.
Section 8
Meal allowance will be as follows:
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner

$ 7.00 per day
$ 8.00 per day
$15.00 per day

Reasonable allowances will be maintained during less than full
day assignments.
The above will not apply if the Company
provides/pays for meals as a part of the assignment.
Section 9
It is not the intention of the Company to permanently reduce the
existing bargaining unit by transferring employees in and out of
this geographical area; provided, however, the Company retains
the right to assign and transfer employees into and out of this
geographical area.
Permanent transfers shall first be on a voluntary basis by each
job classification (where such volunteers are qualified). When
a qualified volunteer cannot be found, the Company shall have
the right to require the lowest seniority employee in the job
classification (who is qualified) to take such transfer.
Temporary transfers can be up to six months duration. Temporary
transfers shall first be on a voluntary basis by each job
classification (where such volunteers are qualified). When a
qualified volunteer cannot be found the Company shall have the
right to require the lowest seniority employee in the job
classification (who is qualified) to take such transfer. The
Company may assign any employee in a job classification on a
temporary basis.

Section 10
An employee on a board and lodging assignment of five (5)
calendar days or more will be allowed fifteen dollars ($15.00)
per week for laundry allowance.
Section 11
Receipts must be provided to receive reimbursement for all
expenses over four dollars ($4.00). Travel by common carrier is
to be at coach or, if available, special discount/excursion
fares.
The Union contends that the contractual payments for meals of
$7.00 per day for breakfast; $8.00 per day for lunch; and $15.00 per day
for dinner are as the Section states, an "allowance" and not an "expense."
And as such, is not subject to the Section 11 requirement that "receipts
must be provided to receive reimbursement for all expenses over four
dollars

($4.00)"

(emphasis added).

This contract interpretation is

supported, the Union claims by a past practice under which the meal
allowance

was

regularly

paid

without

the

employees

providing meal

receipts, and that this practice obtained for many years until 1990 when
the Company issued a memorandum setting forth the receipt requirement
(which generated the instant grievance(s)).
The Company contends that the contract language is clear; that
each monetary benefit of Article XIV and any Section thereof constitutes
an "expense" within the meaning of Article XIV and Section 11.

And that

that includes the "meal allowance" of Section 8.
It argues that with the contract language clear, any practice to
the contrary
existed,

is not controlling and that even if any such practice

it was

properly

memorandum enforcing

ended

the contract

by

the

Company's

prospectively.

1990

system-wide

Alternatively, the

Company asserts that there has been no discernable or probative past

practice.

It claims that the practice with regard to receipts for the

meal allowance for meals in excess of $4.00 differ from one Company
location to another.
others did not.
has been

Some locations or departments required receipts,

And that therefore, contrary to the Union's claim, there

no consistent practice

supportive

of the Union's

contract

interpretation.
Additionally, the Company asserts that at bargaining, the Union
complained of the uneven and inconsistent practice regarding receipts for
the meal allowance; demanding that the Company act consistently.

In

response, the Company told the Union it would enforce its contract right
to

require

receipts,

and

thereafter,

issued

its

memorandum

in

implementation.
Finally, the Company also claims that at bargaining, the Union
demanded that Section 11 be dropped from the contract, but failed to
obtain that result.
bargaining notes

The Company interprets that to mean that, though, the

introduced

into evidence at the arbitration do not

reflect specific discussion about the meal allowance or the requirement
for receipts, the Union recognized the continued applicability of Section
11 to all the monetary benefits under Article XIV, including the meal
allowance.
I conclude that I do not have to resolve the conflicting
testimony over past practice or the differing views and interpretations of
the bargaining history, because I do not find the relevant contract
Sections to be ambiguous.
Rather, I find them clear and therefore enforceable as written,
irrespective of past practice or bargaining history.

Obviously, Section 1 is introductory and applicable to all the
Sections,
addition

2 through

10 that follow.

It expressly

provides that in

to their base pay, employees "will receive...the following

conditions and expenses"

(emphasis added).

The word "following" must

apply to the Sections that follow, namely Sections 2 through 10.
I

am

also

persuaded

by

logic

and

traditional

contract

construction that the word "expenses" in the phrase "following...expenses"
applies to all the enumerated monetary benefits employees who "work away"
receive

in

addition

to

their

base

pay

and

that

the

language

"following...conditions" applies to all of the other operational aspects
of the "working away" assignment referred to in any of the succeeding
Sections.
Section 1 makes no exception to or exclusions in its reference
to "expenses."

The Union acknowledges that the Company has the right to

require receipts for expenditures in excess of $4.00 for all the monetary
benefits in all the Sections except Section 8.
the Union

concedes

that receipts

Significantly to my mind,

may be required

for the "laundry

allowance" set forth in Section 10. As I have found the contract language
clear and unambiguous, the Union's distinction, based on past practice,
between the laundry allowance and the meal allowance, is immaterial. The
fact is that under the clear language of Section 1 referring to the
"following expenses," the laundry allowance was treated by both sides as
an "expense" and receipts were and may be required for reimbursement.
That

Section

1

intended

to

include

all

the

monetary

benefits

as

"expenses," including the meal allowance as well as the laundry allowance,
is further supported by the final Section —

Section 11.

That Section

is conclusory.

It refers back to all the preceding Sections. Just as all

the monetary benefits of the succeeding Sections are encompassed in the
introductory

Section 1, Section 11 summarizes and encompasses all the

Sections that precede it, 2 through 10.
that attach to each of them.

And it sets forth requirements

These requirements are two-fold.

First it

too provides no exception to or distinction from "expenses," and therefore
like Section
expense.

1, makes itself applicable to the meal allowance as an

And, secondly on an encompassing basis, it limits reimbursement

of the monetary benefits or expenses of all the preceding Sections to
circumstances where a receipt is provided for costs in excess of $4.00.
Finally, the semantic distinction which the Union makes and
relies on between "expenses" and an "allowance" is simply not supported by
dictionary

definition.

The Random House Dictionary

of the English

Language defines "allowance" as "a sum of money allotted or granted for a
particular purpose, as for expenses" (emphasis added).

Clearly, the meal

allowance fits precisely within that definition as an expense.
The Undersigned, duly designate as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties makes the
following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article XIV of the contract by its
requirement that employees provide receipts for meals

costing in excess of $4.00 while said employees are "authorized
to work away from their permanent reporting place to other
geographic areas."

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

March 30, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitrator
between
Local Union No. 3, IBEW

AWARD

- and -

Case #133000023892

Picker International, Inc.

-X

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proof and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The grievance of Albert Pollack is not arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

May 1, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 153, Office and Professional
Employees International Union

CASE DISPOSITION

-andWesleyan University

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named Union and University, the
Undersigned

was

selected

as the Arbitrator

to hear

and decide the

following stipulated issue:
Is the grievance of ROGER RAYMOND arbitrable?
If so, did the University violate Article IX of the
collective bargaining agreement when it failed to
award

ROGER

RAYMOND the

foreman-grounds?

job

vacancy

of

working

If so, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held at the University on March 31, 1992 at which
time Mr. Raymond and representatives of the Union and University appeared.
All

concerned

were

afforded

full

opportunity

to offer

argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

evidence and

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
During the course of the hearing, the Union and Mr. Raymond
withdrew the grievance with prejudice.
The University agrees that no action will be taken against Mr.
Raymond as a result of his application for the job vacancy, or because of
his filing of a grievance, or because of his testimony at the arbitration.

The foregoing two paragraphs and the arrangements referred to
therein are hereby officially recorded in this Case Disposition.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

April 1, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 153, Office and Professional
Employees International Union

CASE DISPOSITION

-andWesleyan University

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named Union and University, the
Undersigned

was

selected

as the Arbitrator

to hear

and

decide the

following stipulated issue:
Is the grievance of ROGER RAYMOND arbitrable?
If so, did the University violate Article IX of the
collective bargaining agreement when it failed to
award

ROGER

RAYMOND

foreman-grounds?

the

job

vacancy

of

working

If so, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held at the University on March 31, 1992 at which
time Mr. Raymond and representatives of the Union and University appeared.
All

concerned

were

afforded

full opportunity

to

offer evidence and

argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
During the course of the hearing, the Union and Mr. Raymond
withdrew the grievance with prejudice.
The University agrees that no action will be taken against Mr.
Raymond as a result of his application for the job vacancy, or because of
lis filing of a grievance, or because of his testimony at the arbitration.

The foregoing two paragraphs and the arrangements referred to
therein are hereby officially recorded in this Case Disposition.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

April 1, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

